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Abstract
The operating principle of certain wireless networks makes essential the coop-
eration between the mobile nodes. However, if each node is an autonomous selfish
entity, cooperation is not guaranteed and therefore we need to use incentive tech-
niques. In this thesis, we study cooperation in three different types of networks:
WiFi networks, Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs), and Hybrid Ad-hoc networks.
Cooperation has a different goal for each of these networks, we thus propose in-
centive mechanisms adapted to each case.
In the first chapter of this thesis, we consider WiFi networks whose wide-scale
adoption is impeded by two major hurdles: the lack of a seamless roaming scheme
and the variable QoS experienced by the users. We devise a reputation-based solu-
tion that (i) allows a mobile node to connect to a foreign Wireless ISP in a secure
way while preserving his anonymity and (ii) encourages the WISPs to cooper-
ate, i.e., to provide the mobile clients with a good QoS. Cooperation appears here
twofold: First, the mobile clients have to collaborate in order to build and maintain
the reputation system and second, the use of this reputation system encourages the
WISPs to cooperate. We show, by means of simulations, that our reputation model
indeed encourages the WISPs to behave correctly and we analyze the robustness
of our solution against various attacks.
In the second chapter of the thesis, we consider Wireless Mesh Networks
(WMNs), a new and promising paradigm that uses multi-hop communications to
extend WiFi networks. Indeed, by connecting only one hot spot to the Internet
and by deploying several Transit Access Points (TAPs), a WISP can extend its
coverage and serve a large number of clients at a very low cost. We analyze the
characteristics of WMNs and deduce three fundamental network operations that
need to be secured: (i) the routing protocol, (ii) the detection of corrupt TAPs and
(iii) the enforcement of a proper fairness metric in WMNs. We focus on the fair-
ness problem and propose FAME, an adaptive max-min fair resource allocation
mechanism for WMNs. FAME provides a fair, collision-free capacity use of the
WMN and automatically adjusts to the traffic demand fluctuations of the mobile
clients. We develop the foundations of the mechanism and demonstrate its effi-
vi
ciency by means of simulations. We also experimentally assess the utility of our
solution when TAPs are equipped with directional antennas and distinct sending
and receiving interfaces in the Magnets testbed deployed in Berlin.
In the third and last chapter of this thesis, we consider Hybrid Ad-hoc networks,
i.e., infrastructured networks that are extended using multi-hop communications.
We propose a secure set of protocols to encourage the most fundamental operation
in these networks, namely packet forwarding. This solution is based on a charging
and rewarding system. We use “MAC layering” to reduce the space overhead in
the packets and a stream cipher encryption mechanism to provide “implicit authen-
tication” of the nodes involved in the communication. We analyze the robustness
of our protocols against rational and malicious attacks. We show that the use of
our solution makes cooperation rational for selfish nodes. We also show that our
protocols thwart rational attacks and detect malicious attacks.
Keywords
WiFi Networks, Mesh Networks, Hybrid Ad-hoc networks, Mobile wireless
networks, Cooperation, Security, Pricing, Charging, Micro-payment, Network pro-
tocols, Fairness, Reputation.
Resume´
Le principe de fonctionnement de certains re´seaux sans-fil ne´cessite la coope´ra-
tion des diffe´rents nœuds mobiles existants dans le re´seau. Cependant, si chaque
nœud est une entite´ e´goı¨ste et autonome, la coope´ration n’est pas garantie et il
faut donc utiliser des me´canismes pour encourager les nœuds a` coope´rer. Dans
cette the`se de doctorat, nous e´tudions la coope´ration dans trois diffe´rentes sortes
de re´seaux: Les re´seaux WiFi, les re´seaux Mesh et les re´seaux ad-hoc hybrides.
La de´finition de la coope´ration diffe`re d’un re´seau sans-fil a` l’autre, c’est pourquoi
nous proposons des me´canismes d’incitation a` la coope´ration qui sont adapte´s a`
chacun de ces re´seaux.
Dans le premier chapitre de cette the`se, nous pre´sentons un syste`me de re´puta-
tion qui encourage le de´ploiement des re´seaux WiFi. En effet, deux obstacles prin-
cipaux continuent a` ralentir le de´ploiement de ce genre de re´seaux: d’une part,
l’absence d’un system de roaming simple et efficace et d’autre part la qualite´ vari-
able du service rec¸u par les clients mobiles. Nous proposons une solution qui (i)
permet a` un nœud mobile de se connecter simplement et de fac¸on se´curise´e a` un
hot spot Internet ge´re´ par un fournisseur d’acce`s e´tranger tout en pre´servant son
anonymat et (ii) encourage les fournisseurs d’acce`s a` assurer aux utilisateurs une
bonne qualite´ de service. Le besoin pour la coope´ration existe ici sur deux plans
distincts: D’une part, les clients mobiles doivent coope´rer pour e´tablir et maintenir
le syste`me de re´putation et d’autre part, l’utilisation de ce syste`me de re´putation
encourage les fournisseurs d’acce`s a` coope´rer, c’est-a`-dire a` fournir aux clients
mobiles une bonne qualite´ de service. Dans ce chapitre, nous prouvons, au moyen
de simulations, que notre syste`me de re´putation encourage en effet les fournisseurs
d’acce`s a` bien se comporter et nous analysons la re´sistance de notre solution a`
diverses attaques.
Dans le deuxie`me chapitre de la the`se, nous conside´rons les re´seaux Mesh,
un paradigme nouveau et prometteur qui utilise des relais sans-fil pour e´tendre la
couverture des re´seaux WiFi. En effet, en de´ployant seulement un hot spot qui
est directement connecte´ a` l’Internet et plusieurs points d’acce`s relais, le four-
nisseur d’acce`s Internet peut e´tendre la couverture qui re´seau qu’il ge`re a` moindre
viii
couˆt. Nous analysons les caracte´ristiques des re´seaux Mesh et en de´duisons trois
ope´rations fondamentales qui doivent eˆtre se´curise´es : (i) la de´tection de relais cor-
rompus, (ii) la de´finition et l’utilisation d’un protocole de routage se´curise´, et (iii)
la de´finition et l’utilisation d’une me´trique d’e´quite´ pour les re´seaux Mesh.
Nous nous concentrons ensuite sur le proble`me d’e´quite´ et nous proposons
FAME, unme´canisme adaptatif de multiplexage temporel qui assure une re´partition
e´quitable des ressources, garantie qu’il n’y ait pas de collision entre le trafic des
diffe´rents clients du re´seau et s’ajuste automatiquement sur les fluctuations du
trafic. Nous de´veloppons le me´canisme de base de FAME et de´montrons son effi-
cacite´ au moyen de simulations. Nous e´valuons expe´rimentalement l’efficacite´ de
notre solution dans le cas ou` les relais sont e´quipe´s d’antennes directionnelles en
utilisant Magnets, une plate-forme Mesh de´ploye´e a` Berlin.
Dans le troisie`me et dernier chapitre de cette the`se, nous conside´rons les re´seaux
ad-hoc hybrides, c’est-a`-dire des re´seaux a` infrastructure dont la couverture est
e´tendue en utilisant les communications a` relais. Nous proposons un ensemble de
protocoles, base´ sur un syste`me de micro-paiement, qui encourage la transmission
de paquets, une ope´ration fondamentale dans ce genre de re´seaux. Nous utilisons
le principe de “MAC layering” pour re´duire les couˆts de ge´ne´ration et de transmis-
sion des paquets et un syste`me d’encryptage a` chiffrement de flux qui assure une
“authentification implicite ” des nœuds implique´s dans la communication. Nous
analysons la re´sistance de nos protocoles a` des attaques rationnelles et malveil-
lantes. Nous prouvons, qu’en utilisant notre solution, la collaboration devient un
choix rationnel pour les nœuds e´goı¨stes. Nous prouvons e´galement que nos proto-
coles re´sistent aux attaques rationnelles et de´tectent les attaques malveillantes.
Mots-clefs
Re´seauxWiFi, Re´seauxMesh, Re´seaux Ad-hoc hybrides, Re´seaux sans-fil mo-
biles, Coope´ration, Se´curite´, Micro-paiement, Protocoles re´seaux, Equite´, Re´putation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In existing wireless networks, cooperation between mobile nodes or wireless
access points is, in essence, not required. However, for emerging new families
of wireless networks, cooperation would be highly desirable in terms of network
performance and overhead reduction. In this thesis, we consider three possible
extensions of existing wireless networks and technologies, where cooperation is
beneficial. The goal of each of these extensions is to propose a secure, efficient and
low-cost solution that improves the network performance. Each of the proposed
solutions requires the cooperation of different entities in the network. In this work,
we consider the notion of cooperation in the broad sense: we define it as different
nodes working together in order to perform an action that would not be possible to
perform if each node behaved selfishly.
In Chapter 2, we consider existing WiFi networks and their lack of seamless
roaming and quality of service (QoS) guarantees and we propose a reputation-
based mechanism that encourages the Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs)
to provide the clients with a better QoS. In our solution, the mobile clients coop-
eratively build a reputation system for the WISPs based on their interactions with
these WISPs; the use of this reputation system encourages the WISPs to provide
the mobile clients with a good QoS and offers a seamless roaming scheme.
In Chapter 3, we consider Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) where, by de-
ploying only one Wired Access Point (WAP, i.e., an access point that is directly
connected to the Internet), and several transit access points (TAPs), a WISP can
extend its coverage and serve a large number of clients using a single broadband
connection. This new kind of network allows the WISP to reduce the network de-
ployment and maintenance costs and therefore makes it possible to lower its prices
and be more competitive. Unfortunately, the medium access control (MAC) pro-
tocols used for WiFi networks are inadequate for WMNs as they lead to severe
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unfairness and low bandwidth utilization. Our solution consists in a fair schedul-
ing mechanism that assigns to each mobile client in the WMN an equal share of the
network resources and optimizes the bandwidth utilization. The solution depends
heavily on the cooperation among the TAPs and on the ability of the network op-
erator to detect attacks such as intrusion or node replication.
Finally, in Chapter 4, we consider Hybrid Ad-hoc networks (also called multi-
hop cellular networks). These networks can be seen as an extension of Cellular net-
works where multi-hop communications are used to increase the network coverage.
In this new kind of network, packet forwarding is a fundamental network operation
that relies entirely on the willingness of the nodes to cooperate and forward each
other’s traffic. In order to foster nodes’ cooperation for the packet forwarding ser-
vice in Hybrid Ad-hoc networks, we propose a solution based on a charging and
rewarding mechanism.
In these three wireless networks, cooperation between the nodes is not guar-
anteed and we need to define dedicated incentive mechanisms in order to foster it.
Given that cooperation depends heavily on security (see details in Subsection 1.2),
each of these incentive mechanisms has to be secure against a certain number of
attacks; we define in Subsection 1.3 the adversarial and threat models we consider
in this thesis.
WiFi Networks
Mesh Networks
Hybrid Ad-hoc Networks
Wired
Network
Figure 1.1: The three networks considered in this thesis.
The three kinds of networks are presented in this specific order on purpose.
Indeed, given that the incentive mechanisms that we propose in this thesis have to
be secure, we present the networks in an increasing order of the security challenges.
As shown in Figure 1.1, in a WiFi network, a message M goes typically from
the mobile client to the Internet (through the WAP) and vice versa. Therefore,
M has to be secured when it is sent over the link between the mobile client and
the WAP, and in the wired network. For WMNs however, M traverses a multi-
hop route in order to reach the WAP or the mobile client. Thus, in addition to
the protection in the wired network, M has to be secured in the multi-hop route
between the mobile client and the WAP. This protection can be performed at each
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hop or end-to-end, depending on the security requirements. Finally, in Hybrid Ad-
hoc networks, the route fromM ’s source to the wired network and the route from
the wired network to M ’s destination are both multi-hop routes. The message M
has thus to be secured at the wired network and in both multi-hop routes.
1.1 Cooperation in Wireless Networks
As stated earlier, we define cooperation as different nodes working together
in order to perform an action that would not be possible to perform if each node
behaved selfishly. Each node X wants to maximize its utility function UX , which
can be expressed as:
UX = bX − cX
where bX represents the benefit obtained by node X and cX represents the cost
of cooperation (e.g., battery consumption during packet forwarding). The benefit
obtained by the nodes is expressed exclusively in terms of economy of resources,
network availability, received throughput or QoS. This means that, for example,
the satisfaction of harming another node is not considered as a benefit: it rather
characterizes a malicious behavior (see Subsection 1.3.1).
The goal of a “regular” node is to maximize its utility function, therefore the in-
centive mechanism has to be designed so that cooperation becomes the best choice
for these nodes. However, it is very difficult to design a perfect incentive mecha-
nism and some nodes may find a breach in the system where they can maximize
their utility function by departing from the original operation of the network. It
is also possible for some nodes to pursue a different goal, e.g., instead of aiming
at maximizing their utility function, they want to affect the performance of one or
several other nodes in the network. We consider all the nodes that depart from the
original operation of the network as attackers. We discuss the adversarial model
more in details in Subsection 1.3.1.
To exemplify, let us consider peer-to-peer (P2P) networks where the impor-
tance of the cooperation between the users is obvious. In P2P networks, the payoff
of an end-user depends on three main parameters:
• The probability of finding the file it searches for: A higher probability leads
to a higher benefit.
• The downloading speed: The higher the speed, the higher the benefit.
• The accuracy of the information: The satisfaction level of the end-users de-
pends on whether the data they download corresponds to the data they expect
to receive.
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It is clear that these three parameters depend heavily on the level of participa-
tion of the end-users. This participation can be represented by three main factors:
The time they spend online, the amount of data they share, and the accuracy of
these data.
We can reasonably assume that in P2P networks, the goal of a typical end-
user is to download accurate data, to maximize the probability of finding this data
and to maximize the downloading speed. Some end-users can have however a
totally different goal: For example, if we consider that an end-user is part of the
entertainment industry, its goal could be to flood the network with fake data in order
to discourage the other end-users from illegally downloading songs and movies.
Given that this special user aims at disrupting the operation of the P2P network,
we can consider it as an attacker. Note that the definition of attacker does not take
into consideration the legitimacy of the attacker’s actions.
In P2P networks, the network administrator can also be part of the system
and can integrate cooperation mechanisms in the P2P client in order to counter
the attackers’ actions, e.g., by using a reputation system, it would be possible to
evaluate the behavior of the end-users or the accuracy of the data circulating in the
network.
1.2 Interdependence between Cooperation and Security
In some networks (e.g., military networks), the cooperation between the nodes
is guaranteed because the network is, in essence, meant to contain only cooperative
nodes. However, in civilian wireless networks, each node is potentially controlled
by a different entity that may be selfish, meaning that cooperation is not guaran-
teed anymore. If cooperation is essential for the operation of the network, incentive
techniques have to be used to encourage cooperation. However, if these incentive
techniques are not properly protected against cheating, they can very rapidly be-
come useless. For example, in order to foster end-users cooperation in the P2P
network Kazaa [57], the network administrators introduced in the P2P client a rep-
utation system that evaluates the behavior of the end-user depending on the amount
of data that it uploads to other users. But, the reputation of each end-user was main-
tained at the end-user itself; tampering with the reputation system was so easy that
it became meaningless to use it [39]. Other P2P networks adapted to this reality and
now some of them propose a more robust reputation system where the reputation
is not stored at the node itself (e.g., eMule [79]).
These examples clearly show that cooperation and security represent two closely
intricate notions. Securing the incentive mechanisms however has to be considered
from a broad perspective. Indeed, ensuring the integrity of the messages used to
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establish and maintain a reputation system is neither sufficient nor efficient in a
wireless network where simple and powerful attacks such as Sybil attack, node
duplication or intrusion are possible.
1.3 Security in Wireless Networks
1.3.1 Adversarial Model
We define an adversary as a node that intentionally deviates from the original
operation of the network. The adversary’s actions aim at disrupting one or several
of the following security objectives:
• Data integrity: Ensuring data has not been altered.
• Node and data authentication: Verifying the identity of a node or the origin
of the data.
• Data confidentiality: Keeping the data secret from all except those who are
authorized to see it.
• Non-repudiation: Preventing the denial of previous commitments or actions.
• Node anonymity: Concealing the identity of an entity involved in some pro-
cess.
• Availability: Maintaining the system operational.
An attacker A is rational if its goal is to increase its utility function and if,
by cheating, it can do so, e.g., by receiving extra payments, more service or by
saving resources. Otherwise, A is malicious. Note that if each node represents an
independent and selfish entity and if some aspects of the solution make it possible
to increase a node’s utility function by departing from the original set of protocols,
then every node in the network is potentially an attacker.
We assume that several attackers can collude to perform more sophisticated
attacks. We also assume that an attacker is occasionally able to compromise nodes
by retrieving their secret information.
For the three incentive mechanisms we present in this thesis, we will consider
exclusively attacks performed against the different phases of our protocols, mean-
ing that we do not consider other arbitrary attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks based on jamming. However, in some cases, DoS attacks can be rational.
For example, as we will see in Chapter 3, a Wireless Internet Service provider
(WISP) can jam access points managed by its competitors to disrupt its service and
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to get its clients. Therefore, we design our solutions with DoS in mind, meaning
that we define sets of protocols where the effect of these attacks is minimal and
where we can rapidly detect the attack. We also make sure that we do not expose
protocol participants to unnecessary risks by relying on heavyweight operations.
1.3.2 Threat Model
We distinguish between passive and active attacks. In passive attacks, the at-
tacker analyzes the data without altering them (we also refer to these kinds of
attacks as eavesdropping attacks), whereas in active attacks, the attacker modifies,
deletes or injects data in the network.
There is a large variety of active attacks; some are specific to the incentive
mechanism and the others are general attacks that are independent of it. We iden-
tify the following general attacks:
• Packet Dropping Attack: A drops a packet it is asked to forward.
• Filtering Attack: A modifies a packet it is asked to forward.
• Replay Attack: A replays a valid packet out of its legitimate context.
• Emulation Attack: A uses the secret key of a node
• DoS attacks: A prevents two or more nodes from communicating, e.g., by
jamming the wireless channel.
• Sybil Attack: A has different identities
• Intrusion Attack: A is an unauthorized node but it manages to be accepted
in the network as a valid node.
• Node Duplication Attack: A creates one or several instances of a node. This
attack is also referred to as cloning attack.
We will specify the list of specific attacks in each of the chapters.
Chapter 2
Reputation System for WiFi
Networks
2.1 Introduction
The rapid growth of WiFi networks over the past years is due primarily to
the fact that they solve several of the intrinsic drawbacks of cellular data services
such as GSM/GPRS/UMTS. These drawbacks are mainly the relatively low of-
fered bitrates and the slow deployment of new features due to several factors such
as the large size and the oligopolistic behavior of the operators, their willingness
to provide homogeneous service, and the huge upfront investment. Therefore, the
deployment of wireless networks such as WiFi in unlicensed frequencies makes
it possible to envision a substantial paradigm shift, with very significant benefits:
much higher bandwidth, deployment based possibly on local initiative, higher com-
petition, and much shorter time-to-market for new features. This may, in turn, pave
the way for new types of services.
In recent years, wireless Internet service providers (WISPs) have installed thou-
sands of WiFi hot spots notably in cafes, hotels and airports. However, two major
problems still need to be solved. The first problem is the provision of a seamless
roaming1 scheme that would encourage small operators to enter into the market.
This is a fundamental issue for the future of mobile communications. Indeed, with-
out an appropriate scheme, only large stakeholders would be able to operate their
network in a profitable way, and would impose a market organization very similar
to the one observed today for cellular networks; one of the greatest opportunities to
1Note that by roaming we designate the operation of obtaining service from different operators,
and not the handoff between access points (whether managed by the same provider or by two different
providers). The handoff problem is out of the scope of this work.
8 Reputation System for WiFi Networks
fuel innovation in wireless communications would be missed. The second problem
is the lack of a good quality of service guarantee for the users.
This chapter provides a response to these challenges. By appropriately un-
bundling the major functions of the network, our solution institutes a virtuous cy-
cle of deployment and usage: Each WISP will be encouraged to deploy its network
and will be confident that mobile users registered with other WISPs will pay for the
service it provides them; likewise, users will be assured that the WISPs are under
the scrutiny of all the other users (including the roaming ones), and that they will
be informed about their degree of satisfaction.
As we will see, the solution is relatively simple, provided that the roles of the
different entities are clearly defined. We describe these entities in detail, along
with the security protocols and the charging mechanism. In order to facilitate user
acceptance, the proposed solution minimizes user involvement: once the mobile
device has been initialized, it can make all decisions autonomously.
One of the major goals of this work is to build up trust between mobile users
and WISPs. For this reason, we provide a detailed threat analysis and we show that
the proposed protocols can thwart rational attacks and detect malicious attacks (we
define these terms in Subsection 2.2.2).
Outline This chapter is organized in the following way: In Section 2.2 we present
the system and trust models and in Section 2.3, we give an overview of the pro-
posed solution and describe the details of the protocols. We evaluate the reputation
system by means of simulations in Section 2.4 and we study the security of the pro-
tocols in Section 2.5. We evaluate the overhead in Section 2.6. Finally, we present
the state of the art in Section 2.7 and we conclude in Section 2.8.
2.2 System and Trust Models
2.2.1 System Model
In this chapter, we consider a mobile node (MN) that wants to connect to the
Internet via a neighboring hot spot (i.e., a hot spot that is within its power range);
we assume the hot spot to be managed by a WISP that we denote by S (see Fig-
ure 2.1). MN is affiliated with its home WISP2 H with whom it has an account and
shares a symmetric key kHM . We assume that all the messages exchanged between
MN and H go through S, however, we ensure MN’s anonymity with respect to a
foreign WISP S (note that it is possible to have S = H).
2The solution works even ifH does not operate hot spots itself.
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Figure 2.1: System model.
In our model, all WISPs are registered with the trusted central authority (TCA)
that creates for each of them a public/private key pair and a certificate of their
public key and of their identity. We assume that TCA’s public key is known by all
other entities. In a “grassroots” vision, TCA would be a federation of WISPs, who
join forces to centralize a few strategic functions. In a more conventional vision,
TCA can be under the control of a world-wide organization such as a quality control
company, a certification company, or a global telecommunications operator. TCA
servers can be distributed to avoid bottlenecks.
In this work, we present a reputation based mechanism that, on the one hand,
allows MN to evaluate the behavior of the WISPs and, on the other hand, encour-
ages the WISPs to provide the users with good QoS. In our model, each WISP has
what we call a reputation record that represents an evaluation of its behavior and
that is generated and signed by TCA. The choice of the initial reputation record of
a WISP is discussed in Section 2.4.
2.2.2 Trust and Adversarial Model
We consider an attackerA that wants to perform an attack against our protocols
(see Section 2.5 for the list of attacks). A can be a mobile node or a WISP. We
assume that (i) the TCA never cheats and is trusted by the other parties for all the
actions it performs; (ii) the WISPs (here S and H) are rational and therefore they
cheat (i.e., perform one of the attacks presented in Section 2.5) only if it is to their
advantage (e.g., in terms of money); and (iii) MN may be malicious and therefore
it can cheat even if there is no gain from cheating (this implicitly assumes thatMN
can also perform rational attacks). We also assume that MN trusts H to manage
its account and that several attackers can collude and share information (possibly
their secret keys) to perform more sophisticated attacks.
In this chapter, we want to study the effect of rational and malicious attacks
on our set of protocols. Our goal is to make sure that our solution thwarts rational
attacks, detects malicious attacks and, if possible, identifies the attacker.
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Confidentiality of data is not an issue in our case, so we do not consider pas-
sive attacks where the attacker eavesdrops the data exchanges between two parties.
Note that this is an orthogonal issue that is easily addressed using standard security
techniques.
2.3 Details of the Protocols
2.3.1 Rationale of the Solution
Our solution consists of four phases: Session Setup, Service Provision and
Payment, Session Closing and Reputation Update.
Session Setup: When MN wants to connect to the Internet, it contacts all the
neighboring WISPs3 and selects the WISP S that presents the best offer. The deci-
sion making is based, among other criteria, on the reputation records of the WISPs
(see Subsection 2.3.3). Then, MN and S establish a secure session by setting up a
symmetric key kMS .
Service Provision and Payment: This secure session is divided into parts. Dur-
ing the i-th part, MN sends a payment proof for the i-th part of the service and
S provides that part of the service. In order to make sure that the mobile nodes
pay for the service they receive, we use a credit-based micro-payment scheme: the
PayWord scheme [76] (see Subsection 2.3.2).
Session Closing: At the end of the connection, the session is closed and MN
reports on the QoS it received to TCA.
Reputation Update: TCA collects the feedback about the different WISPs, up-
dates periodically the reputation records according to the collected information,
and provides the WISPs with their new reputation records.
2.3.2 Basic Mechanisms
Micro-payment scheme
As already mentioned in Section 2.2, the payment scheme we use in this work
is the PayWord scheme [76]:
During the session setup, MN generates a long fresh chain of paywords w0,
w1, ..., wn by choosing wn at random and by computing wi = h(wi+1) for i =
n − 1, n − 2, . . . , 0, where h is a one-way hash function and n is the maximum
number of payments that MN can send to S during the session. Then, MN reveals
the root w0 of the payword chain (which is not considered as a payword itself) to
S, H and TCA.
3Note that we refer to the access points using the identities of the WISPs that are managing them.
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During the secure session, MN sends (wi , i) to S as a payment proof for the
i-th part of the service. S can easily verify wi using wi−1 that is known from the
previous micro-payment or from w0 if i = 1.
At the end of the session, S sends the last payment (w` , `) it received to H .
H verifies the validity of w`, pays S the amount corresponding to ` paywords and
charges MN for that amount by updating its billing account.
We use this micropayment scheme because it allows for an offline verification
of the payment proofs and because of its low computational and storage costs for
the mobile nodes.
Authentication ofMN by H
As stated in Section 2.2, all communication between MN and H goes through
S. Therefore, in order to preserve the anonymity of MN with respect to S, we use
the following authentication mechanism, which is commonly used in the industry
(e.g., SecurID [46]): When MN gets affiliated with H , the two parties share a
random seed s that represents the input to a pseudorandom generator. The output
is a random number tag that is 30 to 50 bits long. H keeps a small window (e.g.,
50 entries) of upcoming tags for each mobile node and maintains the pairs (tag;
node’s identity) in a sorted database. Upon receipt of a given tag, H searches its
database, retrieves the pair (tag;identity) and identifies MN. In case of collision
(i.e., more than one pair contains the random number tag), H asks MN to send the
next tag value.
2.3.3 Details of the Protocols
Session Setup Phase
This phase consists of three steps (see Figure 2.2): Selection of the WISP,
Authentication of MN and Secure session establishment.
Figure 2.2: Session setup
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Selection of the WISP: When MN wants to obtain Internet access, it scans the
spectrum, contacts the neighboring WISPs and asks for an offer by broadcasting
the following request message:
OfferReq = [ReqID ,NM ] (2.1)
where ReqID is the request identifier and NM is a nonce generated by MN. Each
WISP W willing (and able) to provide service at that time responds by a signed
offer OfferW :
W → MN : OfferW ,SpkW (OfferW ,OfferReq) (2.2)
where
OfferW = [W ,RRW ,AQW ,PrW ,Cert(W ),NW ]
RRW is the most recent reputation record ofW (signed by TCA), AQW is the
QoS it advertises4, PrW is the price it is requesting for each part of the service
(see Subsection 2.3.3), pkW is its private key and Cert(W ) is the certificate of its
public key PKW .
For each offer OfferW , MN verifies the freshness of nW and computes a
value5 DecisionW = RRαW ·AQβW · P−γW , where the exponents α, β and γ are
parameters that depend on the application MN is running6. Then, MN determines
DecisionS = maxW {DecisionW }, selects the WISP S and verifies its certificate
and the signature of its offer. If the verification is incorrect,MN checks the second
best offer and so on. We denote the selected WISP by S.
Authentication ofMN: Before starting the session, S has to make sure that MN
is a valid mobile node that is registered with a valid home WISP. As we want to
preserve the anonymity of MN, the verification of MN’s identity involves H and
uses the authentication mechanism described in Subsection 2.3.2. We have thus
the following messages exchanged:
MN → S : M = [H , tag ,NM
EkHM (MN ,S , tag ,NM )] (2.3)
S → H : S ,NS ,M,MACkHS (S ,M) (2.4)
4The estimation of the QoS offered byW is discussed in Section 2.4.4.
5The decision function given here is an example; it can be any function f (RRW ,AQW ,PW ).
6We can have for instance (α,β,γ)= (2,1,3) for chat applications to put the emphasize on low price
offers and (α,β,γ)= (2,2,1) for file transfer applications to put the emphasis on QoS. The decision
function being exponential amplifies the difference between these two cases.
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H → S : TID ,EkHM (TID ,NM , kMS ),
EkHS (TID ,NS , kMS ) (2.5)
S → MN : TID ,EkHM (TID ,NM , kMS ) (2.6)
(2.3) MN sends to S a message M containing, in clear, the identity of H , its
current tag and a freshly generated nonce NM . M also contains, encrypted using
the symmetric key7 kHM , the identities of MN and S, the tag tag and the nonce
NM .
(2.4) S sends to H its identity, a freshly generated nonce NS , the messageM
and a MAC computed on both items using the key kHS .
(2.5) H searches its sorted database, identifies MN using the tag sent in clear
(as explained in Subsection 2.3.2), looks up the symmetric key it shares with MN
and uses it to decrypt the rest of the message. Then, H re-checks the identity of
MN (the identity corresponding to the tag should also correspond to the identity
MN encrypted in the message) and verifies that the WISP with which MN intends
to interact is indeed the WISP that sent the message.
If the message is not correct, H informs S that MN is not affiliated with it by
sending a negative acknowledgement. If, on the contrary, the message verifies cor-
rectly,H generates a symmetric key kMS thatMN and S will use later as a session
key (i.e., all the messages exchanged between MN and S during the session are
secured using kMS ). Then, H constructs a message containing (i) in clear, a fresh
temporary identifier TID forMN (TID will be used during service provision), (ii)
TID , NM , and kMS encrypted using the symmetric key kHM , and (iii) TID , NS ,
and kMS encrypted using the symmetric key kHS , and sends this message to S. H
maintains a table containing the correspondence between the temporary identifiers
and the identities of the nodes; given TID , H can identify the correspondent MN.
(2.6) S decrypts EkHS (TID ,NM , kMS ), verifies that the temporary identifier in
the decrypted part corresponds to the one sent in clear, and compares the nonce in
the decrypted part with the one generated byMN. If these verifications are correct,
S removes EkHS (TID ,NM , kMS ) from the message and forwards the rest to MN.
MN decrypts EkHM (TID ,NH , kMS ) and verifies the temporary identifier and
the nonce as S did. If everything is correct, MN maintains TID in memory.
Note that if S = H , MN sends message (2.3) to H and H responds with
message (2.6).
Secure Session Establishment: MN generates a long hash chain of n + 1 ele-
ments, computed from a randomly chosen seedwn as described in Subsection 2.3.2.
7H and S can use their public keys to establish a temporary symmetric key kHS . We assume that
this key is generated prior to the execution of our set of protocols.
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Then MN generates a contract
C = [CID ,w0 ,RRS ,AQS ,PrS ]
where CID = [TID ,S ,H ] is the contract identifier and w0 is the root of the hash
chain.
Then MN and S inform H about the contract:
MN → S : C ,MACkMS (C ),MACkHM (C ) (2.7)
S → H : C ,MACkHM (C ),MACkHS (C ) (2.8)
(2.7) MN sends the contract C to S, together with two MACs computed on C
using the symmetric keys kMS and kHM , respectively.
(2.8) S verifies C andMACkMS (C ) and if they are correct, it computes a MAC
on C using the symmetric key kHS it shares with H . Then, S sends to H the
contract C and the MACs computed with kHM and kHS . H verifies the MACs and,
if they are correct, it stores the contract C.
MN and S also inform TCA about the contract:
MN → S : EPKTCA(C , kMT ),
MACkMS (EPKTCA(C , kMT )) (2.9)
S → TCA : C ,EPKTCA(C , kMT ) (2.10)
TCA→ S : SpkTCA(C ),MACkMT (C ) (2.11)
S → MN : MACkMT (C ) (2.12)
(2.9) MN generates a fresh symmetric key kMT that MN will use later to en-
crypt data for TCA (see Subsection 2.3.3). Then, MN encrypts8 C and kMS using
the public key of TCA, computes a MAC on the data using kMS and sends the
encrypted data and the MAC to S.
(2.10) S verifies the MAC and sends C and the encrypted data to TCA.
(2.11) TCA decrypts the data and compares the contract C received in the en-
crypted data with the contract received in clear from S. If they are identical, TCA
signs the contract C using its private key pkTCA, computes a MAC on it using the
symmetric key kMT that is shares with MN, and sends the signature and the MAC
back to S. TCA also maintains C and kMT in its local database.
(2.12) S verifies TCA’s signature and forwards the MAC to MN.
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Figure 2.3: Service provision and payment
Service Provision and Payment
The session is subdivided into parts, depending on the duration or on the amount
of data exchanged between MN and S. During the i-th part:
MN → S : TID ,wi ,MACkMS (TID ,wi) (2.13)
S → MN : ith part of the service (2.14)
(2.13) MN sends to S its temporary identity TID, the i-th PayWord wi and a
MAC computed on both items using the key kMS .
(2.14) S verifies the validity of wi by checking that h(wi) = wi−1, where h
is the one-way hash function used by MN to generate the chain. If it is correct,
S provides MN with the i-th part of the service. Note that the data packets cor-
responding to the i-th service are cryptographically protected using the key kMS
(e.g., the key is used to encrypt the packets if privacy is required and to compute a
MAC if authentication is required).
Session Closing and Reputation Update
At the end of the session, S sends to H a payment request PR that contains,
encrypted using kHS , the contract identifier CID, the last hash value w` it received
fromMN and the number ` of provided service parts. PR also contains, in CID, the
identity of S so that H is able to retrieve the symmetric key kHS .
S → H : PR = [CID ,w`, `,MACkHS (CID ,w`, `)] (2.15)
8In order to prevent the key retrieval by an attacker, MN can use a probabilistic encryption algo-
rithm, e.g. RSA-OAEP [9], RSA-PSS [10] or ElGamal [33].
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Figure 2.4: Session closing and the reputation update
Upon receipt of PR, H verifies the validity of w` as explained in Subsec-
tion 2.3.2, retrieves the price PrS from the contract, rewards S for the ` parts of the
service, and charges MN. H is also remunerated (see details in Subsection 2.3.4).
At the end of the session, MN generates a satisfaction level message Sl as
follows:
Sl = [EkMT (CID ,QoSEvalS ,CID ,w`, `)] (2.16)
QoSEvalS ,CID is MN’s estimate of the compliance of the obtained QoS with the
announced one and kMT is the key MN shares with TCA.
Then, MN sends its satisfaction level to TCA:
MN → S : TID ,Sl ,MACkMS (TID ,Sl) (2.17)
S → TCA : S ,CID ,w`, `,Sl ,
SPKS (S ,CID ,w`, `,Sl) (2.18)
(2.17) MN sends to S its temporary identifier TID, Sl data and a MAC com-
puted on both items.
(2.18) S verifies the MAC. If it is correct, S generates a message containing
CID, w`, ` and Sl, signs it and sends the message and the signature to TCA.
TCA verifies the signature and retrieves the key it shares withMN (using CID).
Then TCA decrypts Sl, compares the CID, w`, ` in the encrypted data to those
received in clear from S and if they are identical, TCA considers QoSEval as a
valid feedback. Then TCA informs H that it correctly received the feedback:
TCA→ H : Ack ,S ,CID ,SPKTCA(Ack ,S ,CID) (2.19)
(2.19) H verifies the signature and retrieves the identity of MN (using CID).
Then,H remuneratesMN a small amount of money ε, which is meant to encourage
the mobile nodes sending the reports.
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TCA collects the information about the satisfaction levels for a given period and
then, at the reputation update time, it updates the reputation record of each WISP,
signs them and informs the WISPs about their new records. The new reputation
record depends on the old one and on the collected information. An example is
given in Subsection 2.4.
TCA considers the absence of feedback as negative feedback. Indeed, TCA
knows that a session has been established between MN and S and that H is the
home WISP ofMN (see Subsection 2.3.3). TCA is thus waiting for the report from
MN about its interaction with S, and not receiving it within a “reasonable” time is
considered as bad feedback.
2.3.4 Charging and Rewarding Model
In this subsection, we provide additional details regarding the charging and
rewarding model:
• If, at the end of the session, MN moves away from S (and therefore can-
not send the feedback via S), it is still possible for MN to report on its
satisfaction level to TCA via another WISP W : W includes its identity in
message (2.18) and signs the message using its own private key. TCA then
verifies the signature and informs H in message (2.19) about the identity of
W . Then H gives both MN andW a reward ε/2.
• At the end of the session, S sends to H the last payment proof (w`, `) it
received fromMN.H verifies the validity of the paywordw`, chargesMN the
amountX = PrS ∗ ` corresponding to the ` parts of the service and rewards
S, using a well-established e-payment technique, the amount9 X−ε. If TCA
receives no report from MN, ε is handled according to some policy (e.g. it
can be distributed to charity).
• The home networkH is also remunerated. This can be done e.g., ifMN pays
a flat monthly subscription or if MN pays a specific amount per session.
2.4 Analysis of the Incentive Mechanism
Our solution motivates the different players to participate in the reputation
mechanisms. Indeed (i) S is motivated to provide MN with the QoS it promised
because otherwise the feedback of MN will be negative (see the analysis of the
9As already mentioned in Subsection 2.3.3, ε is the reward MN receives if it reports on its satis-
faction level to TCA.
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Publicity attack in Subsection 2.5.1), (ii) MN is motivated to report on its interac-
tion with S because it receives a refund ε and (iii) S is motivated to forward the
report (see the analysis of the report dropping attack in Subsection 2.5.1).
However, we want also to study the effect of the reputation mechanism on the
behavior of the WISPs, i.e., the QoS they effectively offer to the mobile users. We
therefore implemented our set of protocols using the ns-2 simulator [45].
2.4.1 Simulation Environment
We consider a static10 network of 5 WISPs, numbered from 1 to 5, and 50
MNs. Each WISP is a home WISP for 10 MNs. Each WISPW is characterized by
a triplet (AQW ,RQW ,PW ) where AQW is the QoS advertised byW , RQW is the
real QoS provided byW and PW is the priceW is asking for. We consider that a
WISPW is honest if it advertises the real QoS it is offering (i.e., RQW = AQW ),
misbehaving if it advertises a QoS that is higher that the real QoS it is offering (i.e.,
RQW < AQW ) and modest if it advertises a QoS that is lower than the real QoS
it is offering (i.e., RQW > AQW ).
We initialize the reputation of the WISPs to maxRR = 100 . At the end of
each session, MN sends to TCA its satisfaction level
Sl = [EkMT (CID ,QoSEvalW ,CID ,w`, `)]
where
QoSEvalW ,CID =
RQW
AQW
Each simulation lasts for 50000 seconds and the reputation updates are made
every 2000 seconds. The new reputation RRW (t + 1 ) of S is computed as fol-
lows:
RRW (t + 1 ) = λ · RRW (t) + (1 − λ) · feedbackWnbSW
where RRS (t) is the current reputation of W , nbSW is the number of sessions
established byW (and already closed) during the last 2000 seconds and feedbackW
is the sum of all QoSEvalW ,CID received over all these sessions (the absence of
feedback is considered as QoSEvalW ,CID = 0 ). λ represents the “weight of the
past” and is set to 1/2 in our simulations.
Note that if S advertises a QoS that is lower than the real QoS it offers (i.e.,
AQW < RQW ), we will have QoSEvalW > maxRR, which may lead to a
new reputation that is also higher than maxRR. If it is the case, TCA keeps
10All MNs are within the power range of all WISPs, it is therefore useless to consider mobility in
this case.
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RRW (t + 1 ) as it is in its database but sends to S a new reputation record equal
to maxRR.
2.4.2 Studied Scenarios
We consider a network of 5 WISPs and 50 MNs. The WISPs are numbered
from 1 to 5 and for each WISP, we define the advertised QoS, the real QoS and the
price it asks for each part of the service. We initialize the reputation of the WISPs
to maxRep = 100 . MNs and WISPs are static11 and each WISP is a home WISP
for 10 MNs. Each simulation lasts for 50000 seconds and the reputation updates
are made every 2000 seconds.
We conducted three sets of simulations to study three aspects of our solution:
Set 1: We want to study the reaction of the network if all the WISPs are honest but
offer different QoSs: WISPs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 advertise and offer QoS = 60,
70, 80, 90 and 99, respectively12. We consider the two following scenarios:
Scenario 1.1: All the WISPs ask for the same price. At the beginning of a
simulation, we assign to each MN, with equal probability, one of the
two following applications: chat or file transfer (see Subsection 2.3.3).
Scenario 1.2: The WISPs ask for prices that are proportional to their QoSs
(PW ∼ RQW ). We expect the choice of the application to have an
effect on the results, so we run 2 sets of simulations; one for each kind
of application (i.e., all the nodes run that application).
Set 2: We want to study the reaction of the network to the co-existence of honest,
misbehaving and modest WISPs in the network: WISPs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5
advertise AQ = 60, 70, 80, 90 and 99, respectively; but all of them offer
RQ = 80. We consider the two following scenarios:
Scenario 2.1: All the WISPs ask for the same price. At the beginning of a
simulation, we assign to each MN, with equal probability, one of the
following applications: chat or file transfer.
Scenario 2.2: The WISPs ask for prices that are proportional to their QoSs
(PW ∼ RQW ). We expect the choice of the application to have an
effect on the results, so we run 2 sets of simulations; one for each kind
of application (i.e., all the nodes run that application).
11All MNs are within the power range of all WISPs, it is therefore useless to consider mobility in
this case.
12We do not consider the case where AQ = 100 because such a perfect case is probably not
possible in real life conditions.
20 Reputation System for WiFi Networks
Set 3: We assume that all the WISPs are honest, offer the same QoS and ask for
the same price. At the beginning of a simulation, we assign to eachMN, with
equal probability, one of the following applications: chat or file transfer.We
want to study the effect of the initial reputation of a WISP that opens its
service. We assume that the newcomer is WISP 1 and we consider the three
following scenarios:
Scenario 3.1: The initial reputation of WISP 1 equals the one of the other
WISPs (Rep1 = maxRep = 100 because the WISPs are honest).
Scenario 3.2: The initial reputation of WISP 1 is lower than the one of the
other WISPs (Rep1 = 50 ).
Scenario 3.3: The initial reputation of WISP 1 is lower than the one of the
other WISPs (Rep1 = 50 ) but WISP 1 asks for a lower price.
For all these scenarios, we assume that the values of AQ and RQ remain con-
stant and are independent from the number of MNs that are simultaneously con-
nected to the WISPs13.
2.4.3 Simulation Results
We run 10 simulations for each of the scenarios listed in Subsection 2.4.1. The
results are the following:
Set 1: The results of Scenario 1.1 show that if all the WISPs ask for the same
price, most of the users select the WISP that offers the best QoS (WISP 5 in Fig-
ure 2.5). The other WISPs (mainly WISP 4) can occasionally have some clients
because the randomness introduced for the service provision at the WISPs (see
Subsection 2.4.2) may lead to a slight decrease in WISP 5’s reputation.
The results of Scenario 1.2 show that if all the WISPs offer different QoSs and
ask for different prices, the choice of the users depends on the application they are
running; e.g., if the nodes run a chat application (see Figure 2.6), the majority of
the nodes choose the WISP 2 whereas if the nodes run a file transfer application
(see Figure 2.7), the majority of the nodes choose the WISP 5 that offers the best
QoS.
Note that in Scenario 1.2, nodes running the chat application do not choose
WISP 1 even if it offers a lower price than WISP 2. By analyzing the data, we
realized that this is because the reputation of WISP 2 is significantly higher than
the one of WISP 1, which is caused by the randomness introduced, for the service
provision, at the WISPs (see Subsection 2.4.2).
13The case where these values vary is studied in Section 2.4.4.
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Figure 2.5: Scenario 1.1: All the WISPs are honest and ask for the same price. Therefore, WISP
5, which offers the highest QoS, eventually gets most of the users.
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Figure 2.6: Scenario 1.2: All the nodes run a chat application. They choose WISP 2 which asks
for a low price and at the same time has a good reputation.
These results clearly prove that:
• the WISPs are encouraged to provide a good QoS and
• honest WISPs offering different QoSs can co-exist in the same network.
Set 2: The results of Scenario 2.1 show that if all the WISPs ask for the same
price, most of the users select the WISP with the advertised QoS that corresponds
best to the real QoS it offers (WISP 3 in Figure 2.8). Due to their good reputation,
modest WISPs (hereWISPs 1 and 2) perform better than misbehavingWISPs (here
WISPs 4 and 5) but are still selected much less often than the honest WISP. Indeed,
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Figure 2.7: Scenario 1.2: All the nodes run a file transfer application. They choose WISP 5
because it offers the best QoS.
among theWISPs that have good reputations (WISPs 1, 2 and 3), WISP 3 is the one
offering the best QoS and thus is selected more often. Therefore, the best strategy
for the WISPs is to be honest.
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Figure 2.8: Scenario 2.1: All the WISPs ask for the same price. The only honest WISP, here WISP
3, eventually gets most of the users.
Note that the mobile nodes have no direct indication on the real QoS of the
WISPs. They are however able to correctly evaluate the behavior of the WISPs
because the correspondence between the advertised QoS and the real QoS is taken
into consideration in the updating of the reputations.
The results for Scenario 2.2 show that almost all the nodes that run the chat
application (see Figure 2.9) choose WISP 1, which asks for the lowest price and at
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the same time has a very good reputation. The majority of the nodes running a file
transfer application (see Figure 2.10) choose WISP 3 because it offers the best real
QoS.
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Figure 2.9: Scenario 2.2: All the nodes run a chat application. They choose WISP 1 because it
asks for the lowest price and at the same time has a good reputation.
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Figure 2.10: Scenario 2.2: All the nodes run a file transfer application. They choose WISP 3
because it offers the best real QoS.
These results clearly prove that the WISPs are discouraged from misbehaving
(i.e., to advertise a QoS that is higher than the real QoS they can offer) and from
being modest (i.e., advertising a QoS that is lower than the real QoS they can offer).
Set 3: In Scenarios 3.1 and 3.2, all the WISPs offer the same QoS and ask for the
same price.
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The results of Scenario 3.1 show that if WISP 1 has, when it opens its service,
the same reputation as the other WISPs, it has more or less the same probability to
get clients as others do (see Figure 2.11).
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Figure 2.11: Scenario 3.1: WISP 1 has, when it opens its service, the same reputation as the other
WISPs (Rep = 100 ); it has more or less the same probability to get clients as others do.
The results of Scenario 3.2 show if WISP 1 has, when it opens its service, a
reputation that is lower than the reputation of all other WISPs, it has no chance to
get clients. (see Figure 2.12).
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Figure 2.12: Scenario 3.2: WISP 1 has, when it opens its service, a lower reputation than for the
other WISPs; it has no chance to get clients.
In Scenario 3.3, all the WISPs offer the same QoS and all of them, except
WISP 1, ask for the same price; WISP 1 asks for a much lower price (3 times less
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than for the others). The results show that by decreasing the price it is asking for,
WISP 1 can “reintegrate” the network and get the clients.
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Figure 2.13: Scenario 3.3: WISP 1 has, when it opens its service, a lower reputation than for the
other WISPs but it asks for much lower price; it eventually gets all the clients.
Note that even if according to the results WISP 1 gets almost all the clients, it
is not interesting for it to keep the price very low because it will probably not cover
its expenses; lowering the prices can therefore be considered a way of “launching”
(if the initial reputation is not maxRep) or of “redemption” (if the WISP damaged
its own reputation because it misbehaved).
2.4.4 Prediction of the QoS offered by the WISP
The results of Scenario 1 show that the WISPs are encouraged to be honest.
However, this requires each WISP to accurately “predict” the QoS it can offer to
its clients. This prediction depends on several parameters such as the number of
neighboring WISPs, the number of clients that are simultaneously connected in the
neighborhood, the clients’ arrival rate, etc.
In this section, we propose the following simple prediction mechanism that
consists of three main steps: (i) the estimation of the number of clients expected
in the network during the next period of time, (ii) the computation of the total
throughput expected in the network during the next period of time, and (iii) the
definition of the prediction strategy.
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Estimation of the Number of Clients
During this phase, a WISP W has to estimate, for the next period of time, the
number of mobile clients that will be served in its neighborhood. This estimation
has to take into consideration three main parameters:
(i) The length of the estimation period, i.e., the period of time for which the
estimation is done (e.g., the next 15 minutes, the next hour).
(ii) The period of the day (e.g., peak hours, etc.) or of the year (e.g., working
day, week-end, holidays, etc.) during which the estimation period is considered.
This parameter gives an idea about the expected traffic.
(iii) The length of the history maintained by the WISPs. Indeed, while it op-
erates, each WISP maintains the history of the number of clients simultaneously
served in the neighborhood, the duration of the connections, the clients’s arrival
rate, the duration of the connections, etc. A longer history leads to a better estima-
tion.
Computation of the Total Throughput
During this phase, W computes the total throughput expected in the network
during the next estimation period. This value can be computed using the number
of clients simultaneously served in the neighborhood (estimated in the previous
phase) and Bianchi’s throughput performance evaluation formula [18] (see Fig-
ure 2.14).
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Figure 2.14: The total throughput obtained using Bianchi’s throughput performance evaluation
formula [18]. Bianchi’s throughput is very close to the throughput we get by means of simulations.
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Definition of the Prediction Strategy
Each WISP considers the value of the total throughput computed during the
previous phase and decides the QoS it will advertise and to what extent it wants to
“overbook” itself. The efficiency of a given strategy depends on several parameters
such as the duration of the connections and the clients’ arrival rate. We cannot com-
pare these strategies as they may perform differently in different circumstances: A
strategy that performs well in case of short and frequent connections may perform
poorly when the connections become long and sporadic. Therefore, the WISPs
may consider using different strategies according to the situation.
2.5 Analysis of the Security Mechanism
In this section, we analyze the robustness of our protocols against various
attacks against our protocols (see Subsection 2.2.2 for the trust and adversarial
model). We identify eight attacks that are specifically targeted against our so-
lution: Publicity, Selective Publicity, Denigration, Flattering, Report Dropping,
Service Interruption, Refusal to Pay and Repudiation attacks. We also consider the
general attacks described in Subsection 1.3.2.
2.5.1 Specific Attacks
Publicity Attack: In this attack, S advertises a QoS that is higher than the real
QoS it can offer. As a reaction, MN will send a negative report to TCA at the end
of the session. If this attack is repeated, the cumulation of the negative reports will
affect the future reputation records of S. If on the contrary, this attack is performed
rarely, it will not affect much the reputation of S but S gains almost nothing from
performing this attack; as S is rational, it will not perform this attack. The same
reasoning holds if S=H with, in addition, the possibility for MN to punish H by
choosing another home WISP.
Selective Publicity Attack: In this attack, S attempts to performs the Publicity
attack with a specific MN. However, the anonymity of the mobile nodes prevents
S (if S 6= H) from performing the Publicity attack against a specific MN. The
only possible selection would be based on the home network (i.e., S performs the
Publicity attack with all the MNs affiliated with a given home network). S gains
nothing from this attack and thus S will not perform it.
Denigration Attack: In this attack, MN receives a good QoS from S but pre-
tends the contrary by sending a negative report or no report at all.
If no report is sent,H will not giveMN the ε reward and TCA will consider the
absence of feedback as negative feedback. Therefore, this attack is not rational for
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MN. Therefore, it is more interesting for MN to send a negative feedback instead
of not sending the report at all: The effect of the attack is the same and at leastMN
will get paid for the feedback. But this attack is still not rational. Indeed,MN gains
nothing from sending a negative feedback instead of a positive one (the cost of the
sending remains the same). Such behavior is thus purely malicious.
This attack is not harmful for the WISP, unless it is performed systematically
and by a high number of colluding MNs. This attack is rational if the MNs belong
to a competitor that wants to affect the WISP’s reputation. However, TCA can
statistically detect it if the following events happen frequently:
1. The MNs affiliated with H always pretend that they received a bad QoS
(i.e., lower than the advertised QoS) from a given WISP, whereas many otherMNs
report on a good QoS from that very WISP. As the selective publicity attack is not
possible, this situation is suspect and TCA may punishH , e.g., by downgrading its
reputation record.
2. TCA never receives reports from MNs affiliated with H about the sessions
they established with S.
Note that this attack comes with an important cost: if an attacker M wants
to alter the reputation of S by parking misbehaving nodes close to the hot spots
managed by S,M should own many devices and devote them to the attack. Note
also that this colluding attack may harm very small WISPs (with few hot spots) - if
the attacker pays the price - but it is much too costly against WISPs with hundreds
of hot spots.
Flattering Attack: In this attack, MN sends systematically a good feedback
about S’s behavior to TCA. This attack makes sense particularly if S = H; it
significantly improves the reputation of the targeted WISP only if it is performed
systematically and by a high number of colluding attackers. The detection mech-
anism can be similar to the one proposed for the denigration attack. However, a
specificity of this attack resides in the fact that H can create “virtual” MNs (i.e.,
MNs that have an account but are not necessarily real devices), emulate connec-
tions with them and make them systematically send positive feedback. This leads
to a cost that is much lower than the cost of the denigration attack but TCA can
detect it if (i) the MNs affiliated with H rarely connect to foreign WISPs (or at
least much less than average) or if (ii) H is not rewarded for the connections it
established with a high number of MNs affiliated with it (if we assume that this
information is available to TCA).
Report Dropping Attack: In this attack, MN sends the report but S does not
transmit it to TCA (e.g., because S expects a negative feedback). However, as the
absence of feedback counts as the lowest possible feedback, this dropping does
not help S: Assuming that the feedback is defined between values minRep and
maxRep, not receiving the report corresponds to a feedback of minRep. This attack
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is therefore not rational for S.
Service Interruption Attack: In this attack, S receives the i-th payment proof
fromMN but does not provide the corresponding part of the service. MN will then
keep asking for it (by sending again the i-th payment). After a predefined num-
ber of retransmission requests, MN will end the session, which prevents S from
providing more service parts (and thus earning more money) and also affects the
satisfaction level of MN. If nevertheless, we want to prevent S from receiving the
i-th payment without providing the i-th service, we can use the solution proposed
in [23].
Refusal to Pay Attack: In this attack,MN does not send the i-th payment to S.
Then, S will not provide the i-th part of the service and the session will end (after
a predefined number of retransmission requests). This attack is then not rational:
It prevents MN from receiving the service part but does not harm S.
Repudiation Attack: In this attack, S or MN retracts the agreement it has
with other party (e.g., S asks for higher price than agreed upon when the contract
C was established). This attack is not efficient because H and TCA receive the
contract C from both MN and S (Messages 2.8 and 2.10). The two copies should
be identical, otherwise TCA will not send the message 2.11 and the session setup
will not terminate. Therefore, once the session is established, MN and S cannot
retract their agreement. To prevent S orMN from sending incorrect information to
H , we can also require a response from H to establish the session.
2.5.2 General Attacks
Packet Dropping Attack: In this attack, A drops a message it is asked to
forward or discards a message it is asked to generate and send. If this is done
during session setup, the secure session will not be established. If A= MN (i.e.,
MN does not generate messages 2.1, 2.3, 2.7 or 2.9), it will not be able to connect
to the Internet but does not harm S. IfA= S , it will not provide the service toMN;
MN will select another WISP and S would lose an opportunity for revenue.
If during the secure session, the payment proof or the part of the service is not
generated or is dropped, the entity that is waiting for it asks for retransmissions (if
needed several times). If it does not receive the message, the session is closed.
If S does not forward the message Sl of MN, it is equivalent to the denigration
attack (see Subsection 2.5.1).
If S does not generate the payment request and sends it to H (Message 2.15),
it will not get rewarded for the service parts it provided to MN.
Filtering Attack: In this attack, A modifies a packet it is asked to forward or
generate. However, the messages exchanged between the different parties in our
protocols are cryptographically protected, using MAC computations or digital sig-
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natures. Therefore, any modification of a message will be detected at the receiver.
Therefore, tampering with a message is equivalent to not sending the message at
all (an incorrect message is discarded) and it is treated in the same way (see the
Packet dropping attack).
Replay Attack: In this attack, A replays a valid message that was exchanged
between two parties.
During session setup, the messages exchanged between the different entities
(Messages (2.2) to (2.6)) are protected using nonces; delayed messages are easily
detected and discarded.
During the secure session: the payment proofs and the parts of the service
arrive in sequence; a replay is immediately detected and discarded.
During session closing, the payment request and the satisfaction level (Mes-
sages (2.15, (2.17) and (2.18)) are expected only once; a replay is immediately
detected and discarded.
Emulation and Node Duplication Attacks: In the emulation attack, A uses
the secret data of a valid node. A can thus successfully impersonate this node
during all the phases of the protocol. However, if both A and the legitimate node
are connected to the network, this attack can be detected byH (e.g., the node seems
to be at two different locations at the same time) and H can provide the legitimate
node with new secret data. The identification of the legitimate node may however
require human involvement.
The detection of the node duplication attack can be done in the same way.
Denial of Service Attack: In this attack, A prevents two or more nodes from
communicating, e.g., by jamming the wireless channel. This attack is malicious
and solving it may require human involvement (e.g., S identifies the jamming de-
vice and, if possible, removes it).
Intrusion Attack: In this attack, A is an unauthorized node but it manages to
be accepted in the network as a valid node. This attack is not possible against our
system. Indeed, if A is an unauthorized node, the authentication of A byH would
fail and A would never be served by the WISP.
Sybil Attack: In this attack, A has different identities. If A wants to use
all these identities, it has to register each of them with a valid home WISP H .
However, in order for A to perform powerful attacks, it has to own a large number
of identities, which leads with a significant cost for A.
2.6 Overhead
In this subsection, we evaluate the computation and communication overhead
of our solution for a mobile node. We consider only the mobile node because it
2.6 Overhead 31
is the only entity that is severely ressource restrained and because in this way we
address all the wireless aspects of the communications.
2.6.1 Computation Overhead
During the different phases of our protocols, we use symmetric and public key
cryptography primitives to secure the message exchange and to authenticate the
different parties involved in the communication. We minimize however the use of
public key cryptography, especially by the mobile nodes, to reduce the computation
cost.
Hence, MN uses public key primitives only for two messages: it verifies the
certificate, the signature and the reputation of the WISP it selects (Message 2.2)
and it encrypts a message for TCA (Message 2.9). For all other messages, MN
uses symmetric cryptography primitives: 5+2`MAC operations (` being the total
number of service parts), 2 encryptions and 1 decryption.
Public key operations are also used in the message exchange between TCA and
the two WISPs S and H (Messages 2.11, 2.18 and 2.19). It is however possible to
convert them into symmetric key operations, if we assume that S and TCA establish
a symmetric key when they first begin their interaction.
Note that the existence of a tamperproof hardware at MN is not necessary for
the good functioning of our protocols, but it may be a good solution for protecting
the long term symmetric key kHM .
2.6.2 Communication Overhead
Table 2.1 provides reasonable values of the size of the different fields appearing
in our protocol.
Field Name ReqID IDs NX ,pad wi `
Size (bytes) 4 16 20 20 2
Field Name MAC PK QoS, P, R k tag
Size (bytes) 16 150 1 16 6
Table 2.1: Size of the fields used in our protocol
ReqID is encoded on 4 bytes to reduce the risk of using the same identifier for
two different requests. The identifiers of the WISPs and the nodes (W , H , S, MN
and TID) are 16 bytes long (assuming an IPv6 format for example). The paywords
wi are 20 bytes long (e.g., assuming SHA) and the QoS (AQ and QoSEval), the
reputation R and the price P are encoded on 1 byte each (which is enough to encode
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values between 0 and 100). The symmetric keys kHM , kHS , kMS and kMT are
16 bytes long (128 bits) and the public keys are 150 bytes long (e.g., assuming
RSA, see [61]). We encode the nonces (NM and NW ) and the pads on 20 bytes,
the tag on 6 bytes (see Subsection 2.3.2) and the MACs on 16 bytes. Finally, we
use a sequence number ` that is 2 bytes long to support long sessions.
We consider the example where MN is downloading a 1 MB file. We assume
that the file is divided into 1 KB packets and each 50 packets represent a part of
service (` = 20 parts of service in total). Using the values of Table 4.1, an end-to-
end session between MN and S represents an overhead, for MN, of 18337 bytes,
which represents an overhead per packet of around 18 bytes (i.e., less than 2% of
the packet size).
2.7 State of the Art
Reputation-based Systems: These systems are mainly used to build trust and
foster cooperation among a given community. The efficiency of reputation mech-
anisms has been widely studied in various fields and with different approaches.
Studies such as [41], [74] and [75] consider the effect of online reputation systems
[30] on e-marketing and trading communities such as eBay. Reputation mecha-
nisms are also used to foster cooperation in peer-to-peer networks [31] or in ad-hoc
networks [22, 66].
But, from all these studies, we cannot draw a clear conclusion about the effi-
ciency of reputation systems; each of these mechanisms should thus be analyzed
on a per-case basis.
Roaming in WISPs: The deployment and success of WiFi networks is slowed
down by the lack of interoperability between WiFi providers (this is also called the
fragmentation problem [70]): A client that has an account with a WISP A cannot
connect to a hot spot managed by a WISP B. This situation, however, is changing
and more and more WISPs are establishing roaming agreements (similar to what
is done for cellular networks). The roaming can be between providers within the
same country (e.g., T-Mobile and iPass in the US) or on international scale (e.g.,
between the British BT and the American Airpath).
Another solution would be to use the service of a WiFi roaming operator such
as Boingo Wireless [42]. Such an operator tries to solve the roaming problem by
having agreements with as many WISPs as possible. It then aggregates all the hot
spots managed by these WISPs into a single (seamless) network. However, Boingo
does not consider the problem of the variable QoS in WiFi networks.
In [72], Patel and Crowcroft propose a ticket based system that allows mobile
users to connect to foreign service providers: The user contacts a ticket server to
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acquire a ticket, requests a service from a service server and uses the ticket to pay
for that service. However, unlike the solution we present in this work, the authors
of [72] do not question the honesty of the service providers, i.e. they assume that
the service providers provide the users with a good quality of service, which is far
from being guaranteed in WiFi networks. The same problem exists in the solution
proposed by Zhang et al. [88].
In [32], Efstathiou and Polyzos present a Peer-to-Peer Wireless Network Con-
federation (P2PWNC) where the roaming problem is considered as a peer-to-peer
resource sharing problem. They propose a solution where a WISP has to allow the
foreign users to access its hot spots in order to allow its own users to connect to
foreign WISPs’ hot spots. This solution however presents the same problem as for
[72], i.e., there is no guarantee of a good QoS provision.
2.8 Conclusion
Wi-Fi networks have a very strong potential: They are easy to deploy, they use
unlicensed frequencies and they provide fast Internet connectivity. However, two
major problems still need to be solved: the lack of a seamless roaming scheme
and the variable quality of service experienced by the users. The reputation-based
solution presented in this chapter solves both problems: It allows a mobile node
to connect to a foreign Wireless Internet Service Provider (WISP) in a secure way
while preserving its anonymity and it encourages the WISPs to provide the users
with good QoS. Our solution takes into account the fact that the mobile clients
are resource restrained mobile device and therefore have much less computing and
storage resources than TCA, H or S.
We have analyzed the robustness of our solution against different attacks and
we have shown that our protocols thwart rational attacks, detect malicious attacks
and can help identify the attacker.
We have shown, by means of simulations, that the WISPs are encouraged to
provide the MNs with a good QoS and, at the same time, discouraged from adver-
tising a QoS that is different from that they can really offer.
Publications:[15, 16, 17]
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Chapter 3
Ensuring fairness in Mesh
Networks
3.1 Introduction
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have the potential to provide ubiquitous
high-speed wireless Internet connectivity at a fraction of the costs of a fiber-based
network. WMNs consist of Transit Access Points (TAPs) that offer Internet con-
nectivity to the mobile clients within their communication range. A subset of these
TAPs are directly connected to the Internet (e.g., using a wired connection) and can
thus send and receive Internet traffic directly; we refer to these as Wired Access
Points (WAPs). Regular (unconnected) TAPs have to rely on multi-hop communi-
cation to connect to the most appropriate WAP (e.g., the closest WAP in terms of
hops or the least loaded WAP) and therefore to reach the Internet (see Figure 3.1).
WMNs, however, are not yet ready for wide-scale deployment due to two main
reasons. First, the communications being wireless and therefore prone to inter-
ference, WMNs present severe capacity and delay constraints [35]. Nevertheless,
there are reasons to believe that technology will be able to overcome this prob-
lem, e.g., by using multi-radio and multi-channel TAPs [59]. The second reason
that slows down the deployment of WMNs is the lack of security guarantees. In
this chapter, we first identify the security challenges introduced by WMNs by an-
alyzing the specifics of this new kind of networks. This analysis leads us to the
identification of three fundamental network operations that need to be secured: (i)
the routing protocol, (ii) the detection of corrupt TAPs and (iii) the enforcement
of a proper fairness metric in WMNs. We then focus on the fairness problem and
propose FAME, a scheduling algorithm that ensures a fair resource allocation in
WMNs. In order to reduce the complexity of the fair schedule computation, we
36 Ensuring fairness in Mesh Networks
Figure 3.1: Wireless Mesh Network: The coverage of the Wired Access Points
(WAP) is extended by deploying several Transit Access Points (TAPs).
develop a greedy heuristic that approximates the optimal fair resource allocation.
We evaluate FAME by means of simulations under realistic traffic loads. We
compare the FAME heuristic solution to the optimal solution and observe that
FAME’s fair allocation is close to the theoretical optimum. This holds for con-
stantly backlogged traffic, as well as for Web-like traffic patterns.
Finally, we experimentally assess the fairness properties on theMagnets testbed
where TAPs are equipped with multiple network interfaces and directional anten-
nas [56]. Our multi-hop measurements show that the use of directional antennas
and the ability of the TAPs to send and receive concurrently alleviate unfairness
but do not eradicate it; a scheduling algorithm is thus still required to ensure a fair
and efficient resource usage. We implemented a simplified version of FAME that
throttles flows at the WAP. Our results show significant fairness improvements.
Outline The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We identify the
security challenges in WMNs in Section 3.2. The details of FAME are presented in
Section 3.3. Section 3.4 evaluates the effectiveness of FAME via simulations and
via experiments on the Magnets testbed. After discussing the security of WMNs
in Section 3.5 and the state of the art in Section 3.6, we summarize the results in
Section 3.7.
3.2 Security Challenges of WMNs
In this Section, we identify the security challenges introduced by WMNs by
analyzing the specifics of this new kind of networks. This analysis leads us to the
identification of three fundamental operations that have to be secured in WMNs.
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3.2.1 Characteristics of WMNs
WMNs represent a new network concept and therefore introduce new security
specifics. Here, we describe these specifics by giving an overview of the funda-
mental differences between WMNs and two well-established infrastructure-based
technologies: cellular networks and the Internet.
Difference between WMNs and Cellular Networks Themajor difference betwe-
en WMNs and cellular networks, beside the use of different frequency bands
(WMNs usually make use of unlicensed frequencies), concerns the network
configuration: In cellular networks, a given area is divided into cells and
each cell is under the control of a base station. Each base station handles a
certain number of mobile clients that are in its immediate vicinity (i.e., com-
munication between the mobile clients and the base station is single-hop)
and it plays an important role in the functioning of the cellular network; the
entity that plays an equivalent role in WMNs would be the WAP.
However, whereas all the security aspects can be successfully handled by the
base station in cellular networks, it is risky to rely only on the WAP to secure
a WMN, given that the communications in WMNs are multi-hop. Indeed,
centralizing all security operations at the WAP would delay attack detection
and treatment and therefore would give the adversary an undeniable advan-
tage. Furthermore, multi-hopping makes routing in WMNs a very important
and necessary functionality of the network; and like all critical operations,
an adversary may be tempted to attack it. The routing mechanism must thus
be secured.
Multi-hopping has also an important effect on the network utilization and
performance. Indeed, if the WMN is not well-designed, a TAP that is several
hops away from the WAP would receive a much lower bandwidth share than
a TAP that is next to it. This leads to severe unfairness problems, and even
starvation [35]; it thus can be used by an adversary to disturb the functioning
of the WMN.
Note that multi-hopping is also the main difference between WMNs and
WiFi networks, which means that the security problems we already identi-
fied and that are related to multi-hop communications are the main security
challenges introduces by WMNs, in comparison with WiFi networks.
Difference between WMNs and the Internet In WMNs, the wireless TAPs play
the role that is played, in the classic (wired) Internet, by the routers. Given
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that wireless communications are vulnerable to passive attacks such as eaves-
dropping, as well as to active attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS),WMNs
are subject to all these attacks whose effects are amplified by the multi-hop
aspect of the communications.
Another fundamental difference between the Internet and WMNs is that, un-
like Internet routers, the TAPs are not physically protected. Indeed, they
are most often in locations that are accessible to potential adversaries, e.g.,
deployed on rooftops or attached to streetlights. Furthermore, one very im-
portant requirement regarding the TAPs - for the concept of mesh networks
to remain economically viable - is their low cost that excludes the possibility
of strong hardware protection of the devices (e.g., detection of pressure, volt-
age, or temperature changes) [3]. The absence of physical protection of the
devices makes WMNs vulnerable to some serious attacks such as tampering,
capture or replication of TAPs.
This brief analysis of the characteristics of WMNs clearly shows that, com-
pared with other networking technologies, the new security challenges are mainly
due to the multi-hop wireless communications and to the fact that the TAPs are
not physically protected. Multi-hopping delays the detection and treatment of the
attacks, makes routing a critical network service and may lead to severe unfairness
between the TAPs, whereas the physical exposure of the TAPs allows an adversary
to capture, clone or tamper with these devices.
3.2.2 Three Fundamental Security Operations
Our study of WMNs’ specifics led to three critical security challenges: (i) de-
tection of corrupt TAPs, (ii) securing the routing mechanism, and (iii) definition of
a proper fairness metric to ensure a certain level of fairness in the WMN. These
challenges are not the only important ones that should be considered because other
network functionalities also need to be secured (e.g., MAC protocols, nodes’ loca-
tion, etc.). We choose to focus however on these three challenges as they are, in
our opinion, the most critical for WMNs.
Detection of Corrupt TAPs
As explained previously, mesh networks typically employ low-cost devices that
cannot be protected against removal, tampering or replication. An adversary can
thus capture a TAP and tamper with it. Note that if the device can be remotely
managed, the adversary does not even need to physically capture the TAP: A distant
hacking into the device would work perfectly. The WAP plays a special role in
3.2 Security Challenges of WMNs 39
the WMN and may handle or store critical cryptographic data (e.g., temporary
symmetric keys shared with the mobile clients, long-term symmetric keys shared
with the TAPs, etc.); therefore, we assume that the WAP is physically protected.
We identify four main attacks that may be performed on a compromised device,
depending on the goals the adversary wants to achieve: The first attack consists in
the simple removal or replacement of the TAP in order to modify the network
topology to the benefit of the adversary. This attack can be detected by the WAP or
by the neighboring TAPs when a brutal and permanent topology change is observed
in the network.
The second attack consists in accessing the internal state of the captured device
without changing it. The detection of this passive attack is difficult, given that no
state change is operated on the TAP; disconnecting the device from the WMN may
not be required for the adversary to successfully perform the attack; and even if a
disconnection were required, the “absence” of the device may not be detected, as it
can be assimilated to some congestion problem. If this attack is successful, it guar-
antees to the adversary the control of the corrupt TAP and a perfect analysis of the
traffic going through it. This attack is more serious than simple eavesdropping on
the radio channel in the sense that the adversary, by capturing the TAP, can retrieve
its secret data (e.g., its public/private key pair, the symmetric key shared with the
neighboring TAPs or with the WAP, etc.) and can use these data to compromise, at
least locally, the security of the WMN, especially data confidentiality and integrity,
and clients’ anonymity. Unfortunately, there is no obvious way to detect this at-
tack. However, a possible solution that mitigates its effect is a periodic erasure
and reprogramming of the TAPs; the adversary is then obliged to compromise the
device again.
In the third attack, the adversary modifies the internal state of the TAP such
as the configuration parameters, the secret data, etc. The purpose of this attack
can be, for example, to modify the routing algorithm at the captured node in order
to change the network topology. This attack can be detected by the WAP using
a verifier such as the one presented in [77] or using a solution such as the one
presented in [82].
Finally, the fourth attack consists in cloning the captured device and installing
replicas at some strategically chosen locations in the mesh network, which allows
the adversary to inject false data or to disconnect parts of the WMN. This attack
can seriously disrupt the routing mechanism, but it can be detected using the mech-
anism introduced in [71].
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Secure Multi-hop Routing
By attacking the routing mechanism, an adversary can modify the network
topology and therefore affect the operation of the network. The attack can be ra-
tional or malicious; For example, a malicious adversary may want to partition the
network or to isolate a given TAP or a given geographic region, whereas a rational
adversary may want to force the traffic through a specific TAP in the network (e.g.,
through a TAP that it has compromised) in order to monitor the traffic of a given
mobile client or a given region. Another example would be for the adversary to
artificially lengthen the routes between the WAP and the TAPs, which would se-
riously affect the performance of the network. This attack can be rational if it is
performed against a competitor for example.
To attack the routing mechanism, the adversary can (i) tamper with the routing
messages, (ii) modify the state of one or several TAPs in the network, (iii) use
replicated node(s), or (iv) perform DoS attacks:
(i) To prevent attacks against the routing messages, the operator can use one
of the existing secure routing protocols for wireless multi-hop networks [69,
47, 49, 87, 48].
(ii) If the adversary chooses to modify the state of one or several TAPs in the
network, the attack can be detected (e.g., using [77] or [82]) and the operator
can reconfigure the WMN accordingly.
(iii) If the adversary uses replicated node(s), the attack can be detected as the
operator will realize that the network topology is not the one it originally
deployed; it can therefore disable the rogue devices or install new ones [71].
(iv) Finally, DoS attacks represent a simple and efficient way to attack routing.
These attacks are very harmful as they are simple to perpetrate and hard to
prevent. Indeed, the adversary can disturb the communications between the
TAPs in a given area and force the reconfiguration of the network. In order
to solve this problem, the operator has to identify the source of disturbance
[84] and, if possible, disable it.
Note that, except for the first attack, solving all these attacks requires human
involvement (i.e., to go to the field and install/remove TAPs or jamming devices),
which may be considered a successful attack as such.
Ensuring Fairness
In WMNs, all the TAPs use the same WAP as a relay to and from the infras-
tructure and therefore the throughput obtained by the TAPs can vary significantly
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depending on their position in the WMN. Indeed, as shown in [35], the TAPs that
are more than two hops away from WAP may starve (i.e., their clients are not able
to send or receive traffic), which is highly unfair. The study conducted in [35] iden-
tifies the problem and proposes a solution that guarantees a TAP-fair share of the
bandwidth. However, a TAP-based fairness is not necessarily the best solution for
WMNs. Indeed, consider as an example the one-dimensional WMN presented in
Figure 3.2; a per-TAP fairness policy leads to flows 1, 2 and 3 having each the same
share of the bandwidth, without taking into consideration the number of clients that
are served by each of these TAPs. We believe that the bandwidth sharing should be
fair client-wise, because the purpose of a mesh network is to offer a service (typ-
ically Internet connectivity) to the mobile clients that are usually paying the same
flat rate. That is why, in the example of Figure 3.2, flow 2 should have half as much
as what flow 1 and flow 3 have, as TAP2 is serving only one client, whereas TAPs
1 and 3 are serving two clients each.
Figure 3.2: An example of a linear WMN. Each TAP serves a different number of
mobile clients.
The fairness issue is closely related to the number of hops between the TAPs
and the WAP; this means that if the adversary manages to increase the number of
hops between a given TAP and the WAP, it can decrease dramatically the band-
width share of this TAP. A possible solution against this attack can be a periodic
reconfiguration of the WMN; given that the WAP and the TAPs are static, the op-
erator can define - based on the traffic in the WMN - the optimal configuration of
the WMN and force the routes at the TAPs to the optimal routes.
3.2.3 Studying Unfairness in WMNs
This section identifies the fairness challenges in WMNs that motivate the need
for a fair scheduling algorithm.
To illustrate that bandwidth use is unfair even in a simple multi-hop topology,
we set up, in our lab, the three-TAPs topology depicted in Figure 3.3 (a). All three
TAPs are equipped with a single IEEE 802.11a WiFi interface with a raw data rate
of 54 Mbps and omni-directional antennas. The use of the 5 GHz frequency of
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TAP 1 TAP 2 TAP 3
Flow f1 Flow f2
Flow f3
(a) Simple multi-hop topology
TCP throughput (Mbps)
f1 f2 f3
Flows (individually) 19.1 19.1 11.4
Flows (concurrently) 5.8 5.7 2.3
(b) Throughput of each flow
Figure 3.3: Illustration of the unfairness in a WMN
IEEE 802.11a ensures that the transmissions do not interfere with the coexisting
operational networks. The TAPs themselves are all in transmission range of each
other, but we set up the routing such that traffic from TAP1 to TAP3 is routed via
TAP2. To study fairness, we compare the throughput of 3 TCP flows: Single-hop
flows f1 and f2 are from TAP1 to TAP2 and from TAP2 to TAP3 respectively,
whereas flow f3 is a two-hops flow from TAP1 to TAP3. Traffic is generated with
iperf for 3 minutes.
Figure 3.3 (b) shows the achieved throughput when each flow is activated indi-
vidually, and when the three flows are activated at the same time. If f1 is the only
active flow, it can take advantage of the full effective bandwidth (19.1Mbps). The
same holds for f2. However, if f3 is the only active flow, it gets significantly less
bandwidth (11.4 Mbps) than the single-hop flows because TAP2 cannot send and
receive at the same time.
If the three flows are active at the same time, the throughput difference between
the single-hop flows and the 2-hop flow increases by a factor of 2.5. These results
confirm those reported by Gambiroza et al. [35] for a different protocol and a dif-
ferent MAC schema. Moreover, the unfairness is likely to increase in real WMNs
where the topology imposes more complex interference patterns and where flows
may traverse more than 2 hops.
The unfairness illustrated above leads to three challenges that have to be ad-
dressed to achieve fairness in WMNs. First, an appropriate definition of the fair-
ness metric is needed for WMNs: We need a metric that guarantees every user a
fair share of the bandwidth, independently of its location within the WMN. In the
previous experiment, if TAP3 is the WAP, a mobile client located at TAP2 would
get more than twice the throughput of a client attached to TAP1. In a real deploy-
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ment, a user expects to receive the same service from the operator of a WMN,
independently of its location and of the distribution of the other users among the
TAPs. Existing fairness definitions, such as proportional fairness (as used in TCP)
or TAP-fairness [35], do not meet these constraints. In particular, TAP-fairness
assumes that the same bandwidth should be provided independently of the number
of users; such a policy is not suitable for an operator.
Second, the topology and the inferred interference pattern must be taken into
account. Previous work, such as [35], only considers linear topologies. Our fair
scheduling algorithm generalizes those concepts and does not depend on the WMN
being organized on a specific topology such as a line or a tree.
Third, TAPs can and will be equipped with a variety of hardware. TAPs may
contain a single WiFi interface or have multiple interfaces that allow concurrent
sending and receiving of data. Moreover, antennas can be omni-directional or di-
rectional (directional antennas limit interference); A scheduling mechanism for
fair resource allocation in WMNs has to be flexible to accommodate the hardware
diversity.
3.3 FAME: FAir MEsh Scheduler
Our response to the above challenges is FAME, a novel FAir MEsh scheduling
algorithm that computes a collision-free schedule based on the topology of the
WMN. The schedule assigns bandwidth shares to the flow of each mobile client on
the communication links this flow traverses. This schedule takes into consideration
the distribution of the mobile clients in the WMN and the traffic they generate.
Transmissions that do not interfere are scheduled in parallel to maximize spatial
reuse (i.e., the possibility for links that do not contend to be activated at the same
time) and thus to optimize network utilization.
In order to define the location-independent per-client fair schedule, FAME first
identifies the bottleneck link of the WMN, i.e., the link with the maximum traffic-
to-capacity ratio (e.g., if in the simple linear WMN depicted in Figure 3.2 we have
the same capacity at all the links, the bottleneck link would be the link between
TAP1 and the WAP). Then, FAME provides equal bandwidth shares to all flows
crossing the bottleneck link. The results of the fair resource allocation on the bot-
tleneck link are then used to define the WMN allocation vector (i.e., the bandwidth
share of each flow on each link of the WMN). Given that the mobile clients can
create several flows, we propose that fairness is provided at the granularity of the
aggregated flows per client, i.e., all data sent and received by a client. Therefore,
the mobile clients cannot gain more bandwidth by generating several flows in par-
allel.
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To address interference among TAPs in a complex WMN topology, FAME
models the network as a directed graph where the TAPs represent the vertices and
an edge `a,b denotes that TAPa and TAPb are within transmission range of each
other. However, finding the optimal collision-free fair schedule in such case is an
NP-hard problem, even in the simplified case where all links in the WMN have the
same constant capacity and where all traffic is backlogged [13]. In this chapter,
we consider WMNs where the links have different capacities and where the clients
generate realistic traffic patterns (e.g., Web traffic that includes non-backlogged
traffic). We then use FAME to define a heuristic that dynamically adapts the fair
schedule to the traffic fluctuations.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider upstream and downstream links sepa-
rately and we assume, in the remainder of this chapter, that only one WAP exists
in the WMN. We also assume that the TAPs are (at least) loosely synchronized, so
that each TAP can send its traffic during the time allotted to it in the schedule with-
out interfering with the other nodes in the WMN. If we assume that the TAPs can
exchange information about the distribution of the clients in the network (e.g., over
a control channel), then the TAPs can periodically use FAME (see Subsection 3.3.3
for more details about the schedule update frequency) to define the fair share of the
network resources as a function of the network topology, the link capacities and
the number of active clients. The time is divided into cycles and FAME returns
a fair collision-free schedule that assigns, to each active client in the WMN, time
slots that are dedicated to its traffic during the cycle. The remainder of this section
provides the details of the fair scheduling mechanism.
3.3.1 System Model and Notation
We represent the mesh network as a directed graph G = (V, E) where the
set of vertices V= {TAPi , i ∈ {0 ..n}} with TAP0 = WAP and the set of edges
E = {`a,b, a, b ∈ {0..n}}; `a,b ∈ E means that TAPa and TAPb are within
transmission range of each other. The communication link `a,b has a capacity C`a,b
and is upstream if it is used to handle the traffic from the mobile clients to the
WAP and downstream if it is used to handle the traffic from the WAP to the mobile
clients. We will denote by LU the set of upstream communication links and by LD
the set of downstream communication links. The set of mobile clients is denoted by
M= {Mi , i ∈ {0 ..nM }}. We assume, for the sake of simplicity, that all the nodes
in the WMN (i.e., the WAP and all the TAPs in the WMN) are under the control
of a single operator and that the network topology is fixed and known to all the
nodes. The traffic generated and received by a mobile client Mi (1 ≤ i ≤ nM ) is
represented by flows fui and f
d
i , respectively. The analysis we give in this chapter
is valid for both upstream and downstream traffic. Therefore, we refer to the flows
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fui and f
d
i using the generic notation fi. Similarly, we refer to LU or LD using the
generic notation L.
3.3.2 FAME Design
When the WMN is first deployed, the network operator provides the TAPs
with an estimate of the clients’ distribution. The TAPs use this information and the
network topology as an input for FAME, to define the initial fair schedule. Then,
this schedule is updated using the effective distribution of clients and their traffic
demands. The computation of the fair schedule consists of three main steps: (i)
the construction of the cliques, (ii) the computation of the link activation times and
(iii) the construction of the fair schedule.
Construction of the Cliques
Internet
M3
M2
M1
M5
M8
M9 TAP7 TAP5
TAP6
TAP4 WAP
TAP1
TAP2
M7
M10
M4
TAP3
M6
Figure 3.4: A Wireless Mesh Network (WMN) comprised of one Wired Access
Point (WAP), 7 transient access points (TAPs) and 10 mobile clients (Ms). The
WAP is directly connected to the Internet whereas the TAPs have to rely on wireless
links to get Internet connectivity. The solid arrows represent communication links
and the dashed arrows represent undesired interference.
Denote by t`a,b and t
fi
`a,b
the duration of the activation of link `a,b during the
cycle and the time dedicated to flow fi on link `a,b, respectively. We also denote
by F`a,b the set of traffic flows traversing link `a,b, by ri the route from the TAP
servingMi to the WAP, and by T the duration of the cycle.
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We define the compatibility matrix CM as the binary matrix that indicates
which links can be activated at the same time [68], i.e., that do not interfere:
CM = [cmx,y], 1 ≤ x, y ≤ |L|
where |L| denotes the cardinality of the set of links L. We assume that all links
in L are sorted according to a certain order and we assume that the x’th and y’th
links in the sorted L correspond to links `a1,b1 and `a2,b2 , respectively. Therefore,
we have:
cmx,y =

0 if x = y
0 if links `a1,b1 and `a2,b2 contend
1 otherwise
For the WMN of Figure 3.4, the upstream compatibility matrix is:
CM =

0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0

(3.1)
where the rows correspond to links `1,0, `2,1, `3,2, `4,0, `5,4, `6,5 and `7,5, respec-
tively. In the definition of this compatibility matrix, we have considered a WMN
where each TAP has a single interface, i.e., each TAP cannot (i) transmit and re-
ceive at the same time, (ii) receive from more than one TAP at a time, and (iii)
send to more than one TAP at a time. We have also considered a WMN where the
TAPs use omnidirectional antennas. Note that the construction of the compatibility
matrix is independent of the traffic model used in the WMN.
The compatibility matrix can be represented as a graph which we call the com-
patibility graph and where the vertices correspond to the links in L. If the x’th
and y’th positions in L correspond to links `a1,b1 and `a2,b2 respectively, there is an
edge between vertices `a1,b1 and `a2,b2 if cmx,y = 1.
We define a clique as a set of links that can all be enabled at the same time. In
the compatibility graph, a clique corresponds to a clique, i.e., a complete subgraph.
Several cliques of cardinality c > 0 can exist for the sameWMN; we denote byClkc
the k-th clique of cardinality c. In the compatibility graph constructed previously,
Clkc corresponds to:
• The vertex `a,b if Clkc = Clk1 = {`a,b},
3.3 FAME: FAir MEsh Scheduler 47
• The arc between vertices `a1,b1 and `a2,b2 if Clkc = Clk2 = {`a1 ,b1 , `a2 ,b2 }),
and
• A clique (i.e., a complete subgraph) composed of the vertices that are in Clkc
if k > 2.
We denote by dkc the time that is reserved, on the cycle, for Cl
k
c ; we call it the
duration of the clique. dkc corresponds to the maximum activation time among the
c links in the clique:
dkc = max
`a,b∈Clkc
t`a,b
Therefore, the clique Clkc generates a gain g(Cl
k
c ) where:
g(Clkc ) =
∑
`a,b∈Clkc
t`a,b − dkc
The value of g(Clkc ) corresponds to the cumulative time that would have been
necessary to separately transmit the traffic on each of the links in Clkc other than
the link with the maximum activation time (i.e., no spatial reuse).
We define the set CL of all possible cliques; We will use these cliques to define
the collision-free schedule. Even though the clique enumeration problem is proven
to be NP-hard [55, 36], the relatively small size of the WMN and the utilization of
optimized algorithms such as [27] or [80] can make the clique enumeration phase
much more efficient and fast.
Defining the Link Activation Times
The fair schedule depends on the traffic traversing the WMN. To decide which
combination of cliques leads to the best schedule, the value of the gain g(Clkc )
must be evaluated for each clique Clkc . This evaluation requires the knowledge of
the activation time t`a,b for each link `a,b in the network.
To compute these values, we identify the bottleneck link bl , i.e., the link with
the maximum traffic to capacity ratio:
|Fbl |
Cbl
= max
`a,b∈L
|F`a,b |
C`a,b
Each flow traversing bl should receive an equal share of the bandwidth. There-
fore we have:
tfibl =
tbl
|Fbl | , ∀fi ∈ Fbl (3.2)
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Moreover, in order to make sure that the data sent in flow fi is transmitted in
its entirety to the destination (i.e., the WAP for the upstream flows and the mo-
bile client for the downstream flows) within the same cycle, we need to add the
following condition:
tfi`a1,b1
· C`a1,b1 = t
fi
`a2,b2
· C`a2,b2 , ∀`a1,b1 , `a2,b2 ∈ ra (3.3)
Condition 3.3 ensures that the network resources will not be wasted sending
data that will remain trapped in the WMN and eventually cause queuing problems
at the TAPs.
Based on Equation 3.2 and on Condition (3.3), the end-to-end throughput ρi is
attributed to each flow fi that traverses the bottleneck link bl where
ρi =
tfibl · Cbl
T
If we want to ensure per-client fairness condition, then we should have:
ρi = ρj , ∀i, j ∈ {1..nM} (3.4)
Therefore, for any flow fi in the network, the time t
fi
`a,b
dedicated to flow fi on
link `a,b is:
tfi`a,b = tbl ·
Cbl
|Fbl | · C`a,b
, ∀`a,b ∈ L
Hence, the duration of the activation of link `a,b is
t`a,b =
∑
fi∈F`a,b
tfi`a,b = tbl ·
|F`a,b | · Cbl
|Fbl | · C`a,b
, ∀`a,b ∈ L (3.5)
Definition of the Fair Schedule
We define a schedule s as a set of cliques that fulfills the following condition:⋃
Cl∈s
Cl = L (3.6)
Condition (3.6) guarantees that all the links are activated at least once during
the cycle. The set S of all possible schedules is derived from the list of cliques
obtained during the Clique Construction phase. For each element s in S, we define
the cycle duration Ts and the gain gs as
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Ts =
∑
Clkc∈s
dkc
and
gs =
∑
Clkc∈s
g(Clkc )
The network throughput Γ is
Γ =
|F |∑
i=1
ρi = tbl · |F | · Cbl|Fbl | (3.7)
where F represents the set of flows in the WMN. Of all these schedules, we need
to identify the schedule that maximizes the network utilization, i.e., maximized the
value of tbl .
For each schedule s, the value of tsbl that satisfies the condition Ts = T is:
tsbl =
T · |Fbl |
Cbl · αs (3.8)
where
αs =
∑
Cl∈s
max
`a,b∈Cl
|F`a,b |
C`a,b
(3.9)
In order to maximize the network throughput Γ, we have to find the schedule
s∗ that minimizes αs:
αs∗ = min
s∈S
∑
Cl∈s
αs (3.10)
Unfortunately, to find the optimal schedule s∗, all possible clique combinations
fulfilling Condition (3.6) have to be considered. To reduce the complexity of this
exhaustive search, the following simple greedy clique combination algorithm that
approximates s∗ can be used:
1. Set CliqueSet = CL
2. While CliqueSet 6= ∅
• Given the number and distribution of the flows in the WMN, identify
the clique Ĉl1 such that:
αcCl1 = maxCl∈CliqueSet αCl
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• Set sˆ = sˆ ∪ {Ĉl1}.
• Remove from CliqueSet the cliques that have one or more common
links with Ĉl1.
We evaluate the efficiency of this clique combination algorithm in Section 3.4.
3.3.3 Updating the Schedule
The frequency of the updates depends on a variety of parameters such as the
number of active clients at each TAP and the amount of information sent and re-
ceived by these clients. Frequent updates lead to a more accurate schedule and
thus to a more efficient resource use, but they are expensive in terms of message
exchange (between the TAPs), which makes the adaptation of the schedule to each
and every traffic fluctuation not feasible. Identifying the right updating frequency
is thus a tradeoff between overhead and effectiveness. A detailed evaluation of the
update frequency is beyond the scope of this work.
3.4 Evaluation of FAME
In this section, we evaluate our solution first using Matlab simulations, and
then using the MagnetsWiFi testbed.
3.4.1 Evaluation via Simulations
We implemented FAME as well as the optimal scheduler using Matlab. Both
algorithms construct the cliques, compute the link activation times and compute
the schedule that determines when and for how long each link is activated during
the cycle. The optimal scheduler Opt computes s∗ by selecting the best possible
clique combinations that fulfill Condition (3.6), whereas FAME uses the heuristic
presented in Subsection 3.3.2 to approximate s∗. Moreover, Opt updates the fair
schedule after each cycle, while FAME updates its schedule every N ≥ 1 cycles.
The network topology on which the algorithms operate is specified by an n ×
n matrix A where A(a, b) = 0 if TAPa and TAPb are not neighbors and are
not interfering. A(a, b) = C`a,b , where C`a,b is the link capacity, if there is a
communication link between TAPa and TAPb. A(a, b) = −1 if TAPa and TAPb
interfere with each other. The basic time unit for the simulations is a time slot ts.
The duration of a time slot is the maximum time unit such that the time needed to
send a packet across any link in the WMN is an integer multiple of ts.
We use a realistic Web traffic model by using ON-OFF model for the flows
where the duration (Web page size) and the inter-arrival time of the ON periods
3.4 Evaluation of FAME 51
follow a heavy-tailed distribution. We chose a Pareto distribution with α = 1.2
and α = 1.5 respectively [29]. Depending on the average value of the duration and
inter-arrival distributions, different traffic loads can be simulated.
Opt and FAME both take the topology matrix A, the distributions of the dura-
tion and the inter-arrival time as input. FAME additionally needs the cycle update
frequency N . The result of the simulation consists of:
• The amount of data generated by the different flows at each cycle,
• The amount of data sent, at each cycle, using Opt, and
• The amount of data sent, at each cycle, using FAME.
Simulations Setup We perform our experiments for the network shown in Fig-
ure 3.5. We chose this particular topology because it makes it possible to cover
a given geographic area with the minimum number of TAPs. All links have an
identical capacity of one (capacity unit). The TAPs at the center of the cell-shaped
areas (i.e., the WAP and TAPs 3, 4, 5, 9, 10 and 11) are serving the mobile clients
that are in transmission range. For these TAPs, we fix the number of clients to
nClients = 5, resulting in a total of 30 clients in the WMN. TAPs at the cell inter-
sections (TAPs 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8) are relaying the traffic of the neighboring TAPs to
and from the WAP.
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Figure 3.5: The network topology considered in the Matlab simulations.
The cycle duration is set to T = 500 ts and the total number of cycles in the
simulation to 1000.
We define three traffic loads by varying the average duration of the ON-OFF
model: low, moderate and high. As shown in Table 3.1, the mean OFFTime value
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is the same for all three traffic loads and corresponds roughly to the duration of
a cycle (i.e., 500 ts), whereas the mean ONTime value is around 10 ts, 35 ts and
49 ts for low, moderate and high traffic load, respectively. However, given that the
ONTime and the OFFTime follow a heavy-tailed distribution (with α = 1.2 and
α = 1.5, respectively), some of the values these two variables can take can be very
large (see the max values in Table 3.1).
Low Moderate High
ONTime
Mean 10.62 35.17 49.15
Median 4 11 18
Max 41951 95572 55035
OFFTime
Mean 520.01 497.52 520.47
Median 270 270 270
Max 1642759 181030 1488810
Table 3.1: Characteristics of the traffic models expressed in time slots (1 unit=1 ts)
Simulation Set 1: Both FAME and Opt are compared and run with the same
update time, i.e., we set the schedule update time N to 1 for FAME.
Simulation Set 2: We decrease FAME’s schedule update frequency by setting
N = 100. This means that there are 10 schedule updates during the simulation.
Simulation Set 3: We use the same setting as in Simulation Set 2, but assume
that the TAPs use directional antennas and have several radio interfaces so that they
can (i) send and receive at the same time, (ii) send to several neighbors at a time,
and (iii) receive from several neighbors at a time. This results in a compatibility
matrix where all values except for the diagonal ones are 1.
Simulation Results The simulation results for upstream traffic and downstream
traffic are very similar. Therefore, we present only the results for downstream
traffic.
Simulation Set 1: The schedule generated by FAME coincides perfectly with
the schedule generated by Opt, independently of the traffic load. These results
show that sˆ is a good approximation of s∗.
Simulation Set 2: The simulation results for the low, moderate and high traffic
load are depicted in Figures 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8, respectively. Figures 3.6(a), 3.7(a)
and 3.8(a) show the average throughput experienced by all clients in the WMN, the
average end-to-end traffic transmitted by all clients using FAME (with N = 100),
and the average end-to-end traffic transmitted by all clients using Opt. The x-axis
denotes the time in number of cycles and the y-axis shows the throughput averaged
over 100 cycles. The figures show that the difference between FAME and Opt is
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small for all three traffic loads. The difference between the performance of Opt
and FAME is apparent in Figures 3.6(b), 3.7(b) and 3.8(b). In these figures, we
plot the ratio of sent packets vs. generated packets, of FAME and Opt for each
client in the WMN. These results show that the average difference between the
transmission ratio of FAME and Opt for the low, moderate and high traffic load
is 0.05, 0.04 and 0.04, respectively. Therefore, we conclude that FAME is able to
correctly approximate the optimal schedule even when the schedule is not updated
in each cycle.
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Figure 3.6: Results of the Simulation Set 2 for the low traffic model.
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(b) Performance of FAME with N=100, compared to Opt.
Figure 3.7: Results of the Simulation Set 2 for the moderate traffic model.
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Opt and FAME (N=100).
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Clients
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
 
FAME (N=100)
Opt
(b) Performance of FAME with N=100, compared to Opt.
Figure 3.8: Results of the Simulation Set 2 for the high traffic model.
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Simulation Set 3: When TAPs are equipped with directional antennas and with
multiple interfaces, the maximal clique contains all the downstream links in the
WMN. This is the maximal clique that is used by both Opt and FAME (N = 100)
as a fair schedule independently of the traffic load. This means that the schedules
computed by Opt and FAME are the same for all cycles. Given that this scenario
corresponds to the perfect spatial reuse case, i.e., all the downstream links in the
WMN can be activated at the same time, we can hardly talk about a schedule and
no schedule updates are needed. Therefore, the use of FAME may be questionable.
Yet, we show in the next subsection that, in practice, FAME still improves fairness
in such WMNs.
3.4.2 Evaluation using the Magnets Testbed
The Matlab simulation results confirm that FAME computes a good approxi-
mation of the optimal schedulerOpt. In this Section, we evaluate FAME in a wire-
less testbed. First, we experimentally assess the fairness properties of the Magnets
wireless backbone deployed in Berlin [43] where TAPs are equipped with multiple
network interfaces and directional antennas [56]. Then, we present a simplified
implementation of FAME for such a wireless backbone and evaluate its fairness
improvements.
Testbed Description The MagnetsWiFi backbone is part of a metropolitan area
wireless access network that is currently being deployed in Berlin. It connects five
high-rise buildings using directional antennas (see Figure 3.9(a)). The distance
between the buildings varies between 330m and 930m, resulting in a total span of
approximately 2.3 km. All backbone components (antennas, access points) are off-
the-shelf hardware. EachMagnets TAP consists of an IntelP4-PC based router with
independent access points (APs) for each link, as depicted in Figure 3.9(b); each
AP is connected to a directional antenna. All transmissions use unlicensed ISM
spectrum: links `1,2 and `4,5 use IEEE 802.11a (5 GHz) and links `2,3 and `3,4 use
IEEE 802.11g (2.4 GHz). For the first part of the evaluation, we focus on links `1,2
to `2,3 only because links `3,4 and `4,5 are unstable and therefore do not allow us to
draw concise conclusions about the fairness properties. Then, in the second part of
the evaluation, we present the measurements results for all the links in the WMN
and we use them to assess throughput over four hops.
Methodology To assess the fairness properties of the backbone, we first measure
the throughput characteristics of links `1,2 to `2,3 independently, with UDP traffic
and on both directions. Given that Magnets is an outdoor testbed, the link capacities
vary over time due to environmental factors [20]. Therefore we are restricted to
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Figure 3.9: Magnets WiFi testbed in Berlin
statistical evaluations. Then, to actually assess the fairness properties, we measure
the throughput of concurrent flows and multi-hop UDP and TCP flows.
We explore a total of 6 scenarios. For each of the scenarios, we run 10 exper-
iments of 300 seconds each. We generate the traffic using iperf and measure
the throughput at the Linux router interfaces based on packet traces gathered using
tcpdump.
Results Scenario 1: Link Capacity Assessment.
We use Scenario 1 (see Figure 3.10) to measure the maximum capacity of each
link in each direction. Accordingly, UDP traffic is injected at one end of the link
and recorded at the router at the other hand and the traffic injection rate exceeds
the saturation rate of each link.
Table 3.2 shows, for each flow shown in Figure 3.10, the average throughput
of each link, its standard deviation, and its coefficient of variation (CoV). The CoV
is the ratio of the standard deviation to the average throughput. It is an indicator
of the magnitude of fluctuation. Two observations are important. First, both links
have significant differences in average as well as relative variation. The through-
put differs by almost a factor of 5. We attribute the throughput difference between
flows f1,2 and f2,1 on one hand, and f2,3 and f3,2 on the other hand to the fact that
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Figure 3.10: Scenario 1: Evaluation of the capacity of links `1,2 and `2,3, in both
directions.
Flow
Avg Throughput Stdev Coefficient
(Mbps) (Mbps) of Variation
f1,2 31.4 1.08 0.03
f2,1 30.6 4.44 0.15
f2,3 6.98 1.70 0.24
f3,2 4.81 2.00 0.41
Table 3.2: Results of Scenario 1. Each flow is activated individually.
link 1 operates in the 5GHz range and experiences less interference from neigh-
boring networks than link 2, which operates in the 2.4 GHz range. The second
observation is that the throughput of the links differs according to the direction,
e.g., the average throughput of flow f3,2 is 30% lower than the average throughput
of flow f2,3. We believe that this difference is due to a higher interference at the
receiver of f2,3 compared to the receiver of f3,2. The same explanation holds for
the difference between the throughput of flows f1,2 and f2,1.
Scenario 2: Two-hops communications. Next, we assess the end-to-end
throughput of the 2-hops flows shown in Figure 3.11.
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Figure 3.11: Evaluation of the end-to-end throughput of the two-hop flows f1 and
f2.
The results presented in Table 3.3 correspond to the measured throughput of the
two-hop flows: In this multi-hop case, link `2,3 is the bottleneck link and therefore,
it provides an upper bound for the end-to-end throughput. However, the throughput
should not degrade just because we consider multi-hop flows, as the TAPs are
equipped with multiple WiFi interfaces and directional antennas. As such these
results are different from those discussed in Section 3.3.
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Flow
Average Throughput Standard Deviation
(Mbps) (Mbps)
UDP TCP UDP TCP
f1,3 6.99 5.27 1.48 1.43
f3,1 4.36 6.48 2.02 1.01
Table 3.3: Results of Scenario 2. Each flow is activated individually.
The lack of fairness is visible for both TCP as well as UDP load. A direct com-
parison of the TCP and UDP numbers is not recommended as the raw throughput
varies significantly over time; E.g., the fact that the TCP throughput of f3,1 is
higher than the UDP throughput should not be overrated.
Scenarios 3 to 6: Simultaneous Communications. Finally, we consider joint
single- and multi-hop flows in four scenarios (see Figure 3.12).
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Figure 3.12: Simultaneous communications: Scenarios 3 to 6
Figure 3.13 shows the measurements of the scenarios using UDP traffic. For
each scenario, we compare the expected max-min fair allocation derived from the
individual link measurements with the measured results. First, scenario 3 shows
significant differences between expected and measured results, where the through-
put of f2 is much lower than expected. The reason is an unfair resource sharing on
the first link: Both flows f1 and f2 obtain an equal share of the bandwidth (15.6
Mbps for each flow). Unfortunately, the bottleneck link for f1 is link `2,3, which
has a capacity of 5.74 Mbps. Therefore almost, 1/3 of the packets of flow f1 are
dropped at TAP2.
For scenarios 4 and 5, a match between expected and measured results is found:
The difference between the max-min fair allocation and the measured performance
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Figure 3.13: Max-min fair and measured throughput for Scenario 3 to 6 for UDP
traffic.
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Figure 3.14: Max-min fair and measured throughput for Scenario 3 to 6 for TCP
traffic.
is only due to throughput variations over time. However, the results reveal that the
same problem as in Scenario 3 occurs in Scenario 4: f1 transmits at 27 Mbps over
the first link and then drops 3/4 of its packets at TAP2. Finally, Scenario 6 shows
small differences that are attributed to bandwidth fluctuations - the results adhere
to max-min fairness.
Next, Figure 3.14 shows the throughput for Scenarios 3-6 with TCP traffic in-
stead of UDP traffic. The results are comparable to the UDP results: Only the
two-hop flow f1 in Scenario 4 shows a slight performance degradation. We believe
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this degradation to be the result of bandwidth fluctuations and not fairness prob-
lems. However, no severe throughput degradation due to the multi-hop nature is
visible.
These results show that the use of directional antennas and multiple interfaces
alleviate unfairness, as they allow the TAPs to send and receive at the same time.
However, it cannot prevent unfairness if the bottleneck link is not the first link
traversed by the 2-hops flow. Therefore, the implementation of FAME can be sim-
plified for wireless backbones: the construction of cliques can be omitted. Yet, new
schedules must be calculated to account for link throughput and client distribution
changes.
Implementation of FAME
In this Subsection, we describe and evaluate a prototype implementation of
FAME to confirm the above conclusions. This implementation will also allow us
to study the update frequency in future work.
We implement FAME as part of the Linux traffic control (LTC) framework.
We use LTC to shape the outgoing traffic on the WAP. Since the WMN topology is
known and static, we define a queue for each flow in LTC. Moreover, we assume
that the average bandwidth for all links is known and does not change during the
experiment. That is, the link bandwidth may change over time. However, since it is
not possible to instantaneously update the bandwidth changes due to transmission
delays between TAPs and the WAP, we ignore short-term fluctuations and focus on
achieving long-term fairness. The average expected bandwidth is used to calculate
the fair schedule and the results produced by the scheduler represent the input of
the traffic shaper.
Link 1 Link 2 End-to-end
without
FAME
f1 15.1 5.74 5.74
f2 15.6 - 15.6
with
FAME
f1 8.1 7.2 7.2
f2 20.8 - 20.8
Table 3.4: Throughput for Scenario 3 with and without FAME.
To evaluate FAME, we first repeat Scenario 3. Table 3.4 shows the throughput
of flow f1 and f2 at Link 1 (T-Labs to TC) and Link 2 (TC - HHI) without and
with FAME. The results for the measurements without FAME correspond to the
values of Figure 3.13 and show, in addition, the throughput per link. When we use
FAME to regulate the traffic, we can see that f1 increases its throughput by 25%
because f2 is throttled at the WAP and its throughput drops by roughly 50% over
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Link 1. However, this drop does not impact the end-to-end throughput as Link 2
is its bottleneck link. Therefore, these results show that FAME is able to achieve
fairness.
Finally, we consider the use of FAME for the entire 4-hop topology of the
Magnets backbone, resulting in flows that traverse up to 4 hops (See the scenario
depicted in Figure 3.4.2). The link throughput degrades with the distance from the
WAP due to environmental factors. Therefore, the need for FAME is even more
acute in this scenario.
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Figure 3.15: The 4-hop Magnet Backbone.
Flow
f1 f2 f3 f4
without FAME Link 1 6.82 6.33 6.45 6.60
Link 2 4.51 4.95 4.23
Link 3 2.30 3.13
Link 4 3.01
end-to-end 6.82 4.51 2.30 3.01
FAME end-to-end 12.2 7.12 3.11 2.52
Max-Min fair end-to-end 14 8 4 3
Table 3.5: Magnets WiFi testbed in Berlin
Table 3.5 presents the measured throughput without FAME, with FAME, and
the theoretical max-min fair allocation. The results show that FAME provides a
resource allocation that is close to the theoretical max-min fair allocation. The
throughput throttling at the WAP does not degrade the end-to-end throughput of
the flows but allows flows that cross fewer links to obtain a higher throughput.
3.5 Security Communication in WMNs
In the previous sections, we have identifies three security challenges in WMNs
and focused on one of these challenges: ensuring fairness. In this Section, we will
consider an example of a simple and typical communication in WMNs and we will
present a simple and efficient way to secure communications in WMNs.
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Figure 3.16 shows a branch of a WMN where a mobile clientM is within the
transmission range of TAP3 and therefore relies on it to get Internet connectivity;
the data generated and received by M goes through TAP1, TAP2 and the WAP.
Let us consider an upstream message, i.e., a message generated by M and sent to
the Internet. Before this message reaches the infrastructure, several verifications
need to be performed successfully.
WAPTAP3 TAP2 TAP1Mi
Figure 3.16: A typical communication in WMNs: The mobile clientM is within the transmission
range of TAP3 and relies on TAP1 and TAP2 to relay its traffic to and from the WAP.
First of all, as Internet connectivity is a service that (usually)M has to pay for,
the operator of the WMN needs to authenticate M in order to perform the billing
correctly. This authentication can be done in different ways: For example, using
a temporary billing account (e.g., credit card based authentication), a predefined
shared secret (if M is a client of the operator managing the WMN), or a roaming
system similar to the one used in cellular networks (if it is not a client of that oper-
ator); the latter has the advantage of preserving the anonymity ofM with respect to
a foreign operator. Note that we want to avoid, if possible, the use of asymmetric
cryptographic operations by M . In fact, M being battery operated, the authenti-
cation has to be energy efficient, which makes the use of public key cryptography
primitives unsuitable; these primitives have a high computational overhead and are
prone to DoS attacks. Indeed, if the authentication protocol requires the computa-
tion or the verification of a signature, this feature can be misused by an adversary
that can continuously askM to compute or verify signatures; this attack can drain
M ’s battery.
A second verification that has to be made is the mutual authentication of the
network nodes (i.e., the TAPs and the WAP). We differentiate between the authen-
tication of the nodes at the initialization (or re-initialization) phase and during the
session established by M (i.e., during the sending and receiving of the packets of
M ).
The initialization phase takes place when the WMN is first deployed, whereas
the re-initialization phase takes place when a reconfiguration of the network is
needed (e.g., after the detection of attacks). The TAPs and theWAP are energy-rich
and thus can use asymmetric key cryptography to perform authentication. There-
fore, for the authentication of the nodes at the initialization (or re-initialization)
phase, we can assume that the TAPs and the WAP have each a certified pub-
lic/private key pair that is assigned to them by the operator that is managing them.
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These public/private key pairs are used to mutually authenticate the nodes. This
assumption is reasonable, given that the size of the WMN is relatively small and
that this operation is done only occasionally. Note thatM can use TAP3’s certified
public key to authenticate it during session establishment.
The mutual authentication of the nodes during the session is different: the mes-
sages generated or received by M are sent using multi-hop communications and
the use of public key cryptography to authenticate the sender and/or the receiver
of each and every packet is a heavy process that introduces important delays and
therefore leads to a suboptimal utilization of the network resources. Public key
cryptography is thus not suitable in this case. Instead, the nodes can rely on sym-
metric key cryptography, using session keys they establish during the initialization
(or re-initialization) phase or long-term shared keys that are originally loaded in
the devices. If the authentication of the nodes is required at each intermediate
TAP, a possible solution consists in establishing or predefining symmetric keys
between neighboring TAPs; these keys would be used, typically to compute Mes-
sage Authentication Codes (MACs) on the exchanged messages1 and therefore to
authenticate the nodes involved in the communication hop by hop. Otherwise, if
the authentication is required only at the WAP (at TAP3 if we are considering a
downstream message, i.e., a message sent from the Internet toM ), the symmetric
keys can be established or predefined between each TAP and the WAP and used to
compute MACs on the exchanged messages.
Once the mobile client and the nodes are authenticated, it is necessary to verify
the integrity of the exchanged messages. This verification can be done end-to-end
(i.e., by the WAP for upstream messages and byM for the downstream messages)
or by each intermediate TAP, or both. A possible way to do this verification is for
the nodes to establish a symmetric key withM at the establishment of the session;
M uses this key to protect the message (e.g., using MAC). This key can also be
used to encrypt the message if data confidentiality is a requirement.
3.6 State of the Art
Mesh Networks: In [4], P. Bahl et al. discuss the challenges introduced by the
implementation and the deployment of public-area wireless networks (PAWNs)
1MACs are usually used to verify the integrity of a message, but they can also be used to au-
thenticate the sender of the message. Indeed, assume that two parties A and B share a symmetric
key k. A can generate a message m, use k to compute a MAC on it and then send both m and the
corresponding MAC to B. Upon receipt of these data, B can use k to compute the MAC on m and
compare it to the MAC it received; if the two MACs are identical, and given that A and B are the
only two parties that know k,B can conclude thatmwas indeed generated byA. This authentication
technique is weaker than the one that uses asymmetric key cryptography, but it is efficient.
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(network security, privacy, authentication, mobility management, provisioning of
key services, etc.). They describe CHOICE [5], a PAWN that they have designed
and implemented. They describe the architecture and components of CHOICE, the
service models it supports, and the location services and context-aware applications
that they have implemented and deployed in it.
In [2], Akyildiz, Wang and Wang present a survey on recent advances and
open research issues in WMNs and they point out that revising the design of MAC
protocols based on TDMA or CDMA is an important research topic. Another
overview of mesh networking technology is provided by Bruno, Conti and Gregori
in [21].
In [25], Camp et al. present a measurement driven deployment for WMNs. The
solution presented in [25] can be used during the deployment phase of the WMN
in order to define judiciously the position of the TAPs in the network.
STDMA Scheduling: In [68], Nelson and Kleinrock define a broadcast chan-
nel access protocol called spatial TDMA (STDMA), which is designed to operate
in a multi-hop packet radio environment where the location of the nodes is fixed.
The defined protocol assigns transmission rights to nodes in the network in a local
TDMA fashion and is collision-free. The authors propose several slot allocation
methods and present an approximate solution that determines the capacity assign-
ment for the links of the network and minimizes the average delay of messages in
the system.
In [38], Gronkvist compares the node assignment and the link assignment
methods. The author shows that only the connectivity of the network and the input
traffic load of the network is needed in order to determine whether the node or the
link assignment is preferable.
In [19] and [81], Bjorklund, Varbrand and Yuan develop mathematical formula-
tions for resource optimization for both node-oriented and link-oriented allocation
strategies. They present a column generation approach that yields optimal or near-
optimal solutions. The difference with [38] is that, in [19] and [81], the authors
prove the NP-hardness and present a different mathematical formulation.
Fairness in Mesh Networks: In [8], Bejerano, Han and Li propose an algo-
rithm that determines the user-AP associations that ensure max-min fair bandwidth
allocation. They study the association control problem and consider bandwidth
constraints of both the wireless and backhaul links. Their formulation of the prob-
lem indicates the strong correlation between fairness and load balancing, which al-
lows for the usage of load balancing techniques to obtain a near optimal max-min
fair bandwidth allocation. Since this problem is NP-hard, they present algorithms
that achieve a constant-factor approximate max-min fair bandwidth allocation.
In [35], Gambiroza, Sadeghi and Knightly study per-TAP fairness and end-to-
end performance in WMNs (multi-hop wireless backhaul networks). They propose
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an inter-TAP fairness algorithm that aims to achieve the per-TAP fairness objectives
without modification to TCP. This work is the closest to our work, but there are a
few fundamental differences:
• The definition of fairness: In [35], the authors consider a per-TAP fairness
that is very well suited if a parking lot-like scenario2 is considered, whereas
we consider a per-client fairness that is more appropriate if we consider a
WMN where all the clients pay the same monthly flat rate, which is the case
we consider in this work.
• The network topology: In [35], the authors consider a single network branch,
whereas we consider a network with several branches.
• The traffic model: In [35], the authors consider inter-TAP communications
that do not involve the wired access point, whereas in this work, we consider
that the clients are using the WMN to get Internet connectivity and therefore,
we assume that the traffic is always from the clients to the WAP (upstream
traffic) or from the WAP to the clients (downstream traffic).
In [13], we proposed a collision-free scheduling algorithm that ensures per-
client fairness and optimizes the bandwidth utilization in a WMN where all com-
munication links were assumed to have the same capacity C. Moreover, mobile
clients were assumed to send data at saturation rate. In this work, we aim at the
same objectives but consider more realistic system models: the communication
links can have different and varying capacities and the generated traffic stems from
a Web traffic model.
In [78], Tassiulas and Sarkar consider max-min fair allocation of bandwidth
in wireless networks. In their WMN, flows that do not share nodes can transmit
or receive packets at the same time. Moreover, they consider single-hop flows
only. Such a system model leads to an intrinsically different formulation of the fair
allocation problem and excludes many of the problems inherent to WMN and that
we tackle in our work.
Jain and Das present a distributed max-min fair protocol for multihop flows in
WMNs [51]. Their solution is aMAC protocol that is an extension of the VTCSMA
[67] and is applied to a WMN where flows can be created between any two nodes.
It is distributed but is not collision-free; it rather defines a Recovery from Collision
protocol. FAME, in contrast, in collision-free and considers a WMN where all the
traffic goes through the WAP.
2In the parking lot scenario, many cars attempt to leave a parking lot simultaneously using a
single exit. Details can be found in [35].
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3.7 Conclusion
WMNs represent a simple and inexpensive solution to extend the coverage of
a WAP. However, the deployment of such networks is slowed down by the lack of
security guarantees. In this chapter, we have analyzed the characteristics of WMNs
and have deduced three fundamental network operations that need to be secured:
(i) the detection of corrupt TAPs, (ii) the definition and use of a secure routing
protocol, and (iii) the definition and enforcement of a proper fairness metric in
WMNs. We have proposed some solutions to secure these operations.
This chapter presents also FAME, a FAir MEsh scheduler for wireless mesh
networks (WMNs). FAME computes a fair collision-free schedule that assigns to
each client in the WMN a fair share of the network resources, independently of its
location in the network. We evaluate FAME via simulations and using the Magnets
outdoor testbed. The simulation results show that FAME performs well compared
to the Optimal fair share allocation algorithm. Moreover, the Magnet evaluations
show that the use of a scheduling algorithm such as FAME is still needed even in
the case when all TAPs are equipped with multiple wireless interfaces and direc-
tional antennas and fairness may be expected. We show that a simplified version
of FAME suffices in this case to ensure fairness.
As future work, we intend to compare FAME to the max-min fair allocation
and to perform extensive evaluation of FAME in different scenarios. In addition,
we want to adapt FAME to WMNs with multiple WAPs, offering differentiated
services, or controlled by several operators.
Publications:[13, 14]
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Chapter 4
Cooperation in Hybrid Ad-hoc
Networks
4.1 Introduction
A Hybrid Ad-hoc network is a structure-based network that is extended using
multi-hop communications. Indeed, in this kind of network, the existence of a com-
munication link between the mobile station and the base station is not required: A
mobile station that has no direct connection with a base station can use other mo-
bile stations as relays. Compared with conventional (single-hop) structure-based
networks, this new generation can lead to a better use of the available spectrum and
to a reduction of infrastructure costs. However, these benefits would vanish if the
mobile nodes did not properly cooperate and forward packets for other nodes. In
this chapter, we propose a charging and rewarding scheme to encourage the most
fundamental operation, namely packet forwarding. We use “MAC layering” to re-
duce the space overhead in the packets and a stream cipher encryption mechanism
to provide “implicit authentication” of the nodes involved in the communication.
We analyze the robustness of our protocols against rational and malicious attacks.
We show that - using our solution - collaboration is rational for selfish nodes. We
also show that our protocols thwart rational attacks and detect malicious attacks.
The geographic area covered by a conventional structure-based network (e.g.,
cellular network, WiFi network, . . . ) is populated with base stations (also called
access points) that are connected to each other via a backbone. A mobile node can
use the network when it has a direct (single-hop) connection to a base station, but
as soon as it is beyond the reach of the base stations’ coverage, the mobile node is
disconnected from the structure-based network. For the operator, the usual solution
to this problem consists in increasing the coverage by adding antennas; and for the
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user to move until he reaches a covered region. An alternative solution1 would be
to allow multi-hop communications in the structure-based network, which would
make it possible for the isolated node to ask other nodes to relay its traffic to or
from a base station.
The resulting Hybrid Ad-hoc network [1, 86, 40, 7, 83], also called multi-hop
cellular network, offers several benefits [62, 63]. First of all, the coverage of the
network is increased while the number of fixed antennas is kept relatively small.
Reducing the number of antennas is beneficial for the operator because it represents
a cost reduction and also because of the “NIMBY” (Not in my back yard) [58]
attitude that makes site acquisition and approval both tedious and difficult. Second,
the energy consumption of the nodes can be reduced because the signal has to cover
a smaller distance. And finally, as the radiated energy is reduced, the interference
with other nodes diminishes as well.
Given the advantages listed above, Hybrid Ad-hoc networks represent a new
and promising paradigm. However, the proper operation of this new family of net-
works requires the mobile nodes to collaborate with each other. This collaboration
cannot be taken for granted in a civilian network because each user wants to maxi-
mize his benefit while minimizing his contribution. Indeed, forwarding packets is
energy-consuming and a selfish user can tamper with his mobile device to remove
the relaying functions or simply shut down the device when he is not using it. A
systematic denial of the packet forwarding service would remove all the benefits
introduced by the multi-hop aspect of the communications.
In this chapter, we propose a set of protocols to foster cooperation for the packet
forwarding service in Hybrid Ad-hoc networks. This solution is based on a charg-
ing and rewarding system.
This work extends and completes our previous treatment of the same problem
[11]. This work is part of the MICS Terminodes Project [50]. The rest of the
chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the system, including the adversarial
model, in Section 4.2 and describe our proposed protocols in Section 4.3. In Sec-
tion 4.4, we evaluate the incentive mechanism, and in Section 4.5, we analyze the
robustness of our solution against rational and malicious attacks. In Section 4.6,
we present an estimate of the communication and computation overhead of our
protocols. Finally, we describe the related work in Section 4.7 and we present our
conclusions and future work in Section 4.8.
1Note that we do not assume that multi-hop communication is always the best solution to increase
infrastructure coverage. The decision whether or not a given network should be extended using multi-
hopping is out of the scope of this work.
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4.2 System and Adversarial Model
4.2.1 Assumptions
The system consists of a set of base stations connected to a high speed back-
bone and a set of mobile nodes. The mobile nodes use the base stations and, if
necessary, the backbone to communicate with each other or with a host connected
to the backbone. Communication between the mobile nodes and the base stations
is based on wireless technology and the nodes are loosely synchronized with their
base station. We assume that all communication is packet-based and that all the
base stations and the backbone are operated by a single operator that is fully trusted
by all mobile nodes, be it for charging, for route setup, or for packet forwarding.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider that the nodes and the base stations have
the same power range, which, we assume, will lead to bidirectional links (i.e., even
if the quality of the link is not necessarily the same in both directions, we assume
that the communication is still possible in both directions).
We call a cell [62] the geographical area that is controlled by a given base
station. The power range of the base station is smaller than the radius of the cell,
meaning that some nodes have to rely on multi-hop relaying to communicate with
the base station. We consider a model in which the nodes move. However, we
assume that the routes are stable enough to allow for the sending of a substantial
number of packets and thus to amortize the cost of running a routing protocol (see
Section 4.6). We assume each node i to be registered with the operator and to share
a long-term symmetric key Ki with it. Ki is the only long-term cryptographic
material stored in i. The secret keys of all the nodes in the network are maintained
at the operator.
4.2.2 Rationale of the solution
When a mobile node A (the initiator) wants to communicate with another mo-
bile2 node B (the correspondent), it first establishes an end-to-end session with B.
As we will see in detail, in Subsection 4.3.2, a session is a route on which all nodes
are authenticated. This is done by establishing an initiator session between A and
the base station of the initiator BSA and a correspondent session between the base
station of the correspondent BSB and B. These sessions are used to exchange
packets between A and B, in both directions.
For each packet, we call S its source (which is A or B) and D its destination
(therefore B or A, respectively). The base stations of S andD are denoted by BSS
andBSD , respectively. The packet is then sent by the source S toBSS , if necessary
2We consider mobile-to-mobile communication as it is the most complete case.
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in multiple hops. If D resides in a different cell, then the packet is forwarded by
BSS to BSD via the backbone. Finally, the packet is sent toD, possibly in multiple
hops again. If one of the routes is broken, then a new session is established using an
alternative route. Note that the system model described above is similar to that of
[62], with the difference that we require all communication to pass through a base
station. Although this may lead to sub-optimal routes, our model has the advantage
of significantly reducing the complexity of routing from the nodes’ point of view,
since they have to maintain only a single route (to the base station) instead of one
route per correspondent. Of course, the base station has to maintain a route to every
node in its cell.
To encourage the intermediate nodes to forward the traffic, we propose to
charge the initiator A for the traffic in both directions and to reward the forwarding
nodes (the operator is rewarded as well). We take advantage of the presence of
the trusted operator and assume that it maintains a billing account for every node
in the system; our remuneration scheme (see Subsection 4.3.4) is implemented by
manipulating the appropriate billing accounts.
Our protocols are based entirely on symmetric key cryptography. Although
asymmetric cryptographic primitives may seem to be more suitable for implement-
ing some of the functions of our scheme, they have a high computational overhead
(compared to symmetric key primitives), which prevents their application in re-
source constrained mobile devices.
4.2.3 Adversarial model
We do not attempt to ensure data confidentiality or node anonymity and thus,
we do not study passive attacks (where the attacker analyzes the data without al-
tering it). Instead, we are interested in active attacks, where the attacker modifies,
deletes or injects data in the network. We consider the attacks described in Subsec-
tion 1.3.2.
4.2.4 Interaction with the underlying routing protocol
Our solution assumes the existence of an underlying (proactive or reactive) Ad-
hoc routing protocol that provides the initiatorA and the base station BSB with the
initiator route (route between A and BSA) and the correspondent route (route be-
tween BSB and B), respectively. The main incentive for the nodes on these routes
to cooperate in the routing is the expected future benefit (i.e., the remuneration).
Our solution does not require the underlying routing protocol to be secure. Indeed,
the operator is able, in our solution, to detect several routing attacks such as those
described in [49] (see Subsection 4.5.7 for more details).
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4.3 Details of the Protocols
4.3.1 Building blocks and notation
Our protocols use two cryptographic building blocks: A MAC (Message Au-
thentication Code) function and a stream cipher [65]. However, our use of these
primitives is unconventional:
• During the session setup phase (see Subsection 4.3.2), we need all the nodes
in the path to authenticate the request message and, instead of appending
one MAC computed by each of the nodes to the message, we use an iterative
“MAC layering” technique. The principle of this technique is explained in
Subsection 4.3.2. Our solution achieves a similar effect to that of the clas-
sical MAC appending technique but keeps the size of the request constant.
Therefore, our technique is more efficient in terms of bandwidth usage. To
the best of our knowledge, such a scheme has not been proposed yet for
Ad-hoc networks.
• During the packet sending phase (see Subsection 4.3.3), we apply an iterative
stream cipher encryption mechanism that can be considered as an “implicit”
authentication mechanism because it allows the operator to verify that the
packet took the route it was supposed to take. At the same time, it thwarts
the free-riding attack (see Subsection 4.5.2).
Notation: We denote the concatenation operator by | and the XOR operator
by ⊕.
4.3.2 Session setup
As explained in Section 4.2, when an initiator A wants to communicate with
a correspondent B, it first has to set up an end-to-end session. The goal of the
session setup is (i) to test the initiator route (route between A and BSA, containing
a relays) and the correspondent route (route between BSB and B, containing b
relays), obtained from the underlying routing protocol; (ii) to authenticate all nodes
belonging to these routes; and (iii) to inform these nodes about the traffic that
will follow. A node can decide to not join the session, in which case the session
setup fails and a new session is established using an alternative route. Successful
completion of the session setup phase is a confirmation that both the initiator and
correspondent routes are operational and that the end-to-end intermediate nodes
accept to forward the traffic.
In order to set up a session, A generates an initiator session setup request mes-
sage AReq0 that contains a fresh request identifier AReqID (e.g., generated in se-
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Figure 4.1: The session setup phase
quence), the initiator route ARoute, and some information TrafficInfo about the
traffic to be sent3. In addition, the request has a field oldASID to carry the session
ID of the broken initiator session, in case the request is sent to re-establish a broken
session. This field is set to zero in the case of a new session establishment. Finally,
AReq0 contains a MAC computed by A using its secret keyKA:
AReq0 = [ AReqID | oldASID | ARoute | TrafficInfo |
MACKA(AReqID | oldASID | ARoute | TrafficInfo) ]
Each forwarding node i (1 ≤ i ≤ a) on the initiator route checks the traffic
information TrafficInfo. If i decides to participate in the forwarding, then it com-
putes a MAC on the whole message using its own key Ki, replaces the MAC in
the request with the newly computed MAC, and forwards the request AReq i to the
next hop (or to BSA) where:
AReq i = [ AReqID | oldASID | ARoute | TrafficInfo |MACKi(AReq i−1) ]
Thus, when the request arrives to BSA, it contains a single “layered” MAC
that was computed by A and all the nodes on the initiator route in an iterative
manner. BSA then repeats all the MAC computations and checks the result against
the MAC in the received request. It also verifies that the request ID is fresh (i.e., the
message is not a duplicate) and if the request is sent to re-establish a broken initiator
session, it verifies that oldASID corresponds to a valid session identifier previously
initiated by A. If one of these verifications is not successful, then BSA drops the
request, otherwise it sends the request, via the backbone, to the base station BSB .
BSB generates and sends a correspondent session setup request BReq0 towardsB:
BReq0 = [ BReqID | oldBSID | BRoute | TrafficInfo ]
3The initiator A may not have any precise information about the traffic B will generate.
TrafficInfo is thus an estimate for the expected traffic in both directions. If A underestimates the
traffic, the relaying nodes might interrupt the packet forwarding because the amount of data to for-
ward is much larger than expected.
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where BReqID is a fresh request identifier generated by the base station BSB ,
oldBSID is the session ID of the broken correspondent session, in case the request
is sent to re-establish a broken session and BRoute is the correspondent route.
Each forwarding node j (1 ≤ j ≤ b) on the correspondent route computes and
sends BReqj in the same way as the forwarding nodes in the initiator route did:
BReqj = [ BReqID | oldBSID | BRoute | TrafficInfo |MACKj (BReqj−1) ]
When B receives the request BReqb, it returns to BSB a correspondent session
setup reply BRep that contains the correspondent request ID BReqID and a MAC
that is computed over the received request BReqb (including the MAC therein)
using the keyKB of B:
BRep = [ BReqID |MACKB (BReqb) ]
The reply is relayed back without any modifications to BSB on the reverse
route of the request. BSB checks the “layered” MAC and if it verifies correctly,
BSB informs BSA that the session is valid. Then BSA (respectively, BSB ) sends
an initiator (respectively, a correspondent) session setup confirmation message
towards A (respectively B). The initiator session setup confirmation message
AConf contains the initiator request ID AReqID and two freshly generated ran-
dom numbersAUSID andADSID representing the initiator session IDs to be used
for packets sent from A to BSA and from BSA to A, respectively. It also contains
a series of MACs where each MAC is intended for one of the nodes on the initiator
route (including A):
AConf = [ AReqID | AUSID | ADSID | AMACA |
AMAC 1 | . . . | AMAC a ]
AMAC i = MACKi(AReqID | AUSID | ADSID | oldASID |
ARoute | TrafficInfo)
The correspondent session setup confirmation BConf has a similar structure:
BConf = [ BReqID | BUSID | BDSID |
BMAC 1 | . . . | BMAC b | BMACB ]
BMAC j = MACKj (BReqID | BUSID | BDSID | oldBSID |
BRoute | TrafficInfo)
Each node on the initiator and correspondent routes (including A and B) veri-
fies its own AMAC or BMAC and stores the two initiator or correspondent session
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IDs, respectively. The state information related to the established sessions (includ-
ing session IDs, routes and cryptographic parameters) is stored in the operator’s
database. Then, using its secret key Ki and the session identifier, each node i in-
volved in the communication generates a session key K ′i (e.g., K
′
i = hKi(SID),
SID = AUSID and ADSID if i is in the initiator route, and SID = BUSID and
BDSID if i is in the corresponding route, which leads to two session keys for
each node, one for each direction of the communication) that it will use during the
packet sending and the payment redemption phases. The base stations BSA and
BSB also compute the session keys of all the nodes involved in the communication
and save them locally.
The session becomes active for the base stations when they send the confirma-
tion messages and for the nodes when they receive a valid confirmation message.
Node i starts a timer ti when it receives the request message; ti is restarted each
time i receives a valid message or packet that belongs to the session. Node i closes
the session if ti expires; closing a session means that the node discards all sub-
sequent messages or packets that belong to the session. The nodes and the base
stations keep state information in the memory until the acknowledgement and (if
needed) packet receipts are sent to the operator (see Subsection 4.3.4).
Note that in the case of initiator (respectively, correspondent) session re-estab-
lishment, it is not necessary to also re-establish the correspondent (respectively,
the initiator) session if the latter is still valid. The broken session is re-established
using an alternative route and it is linked to the other (still valid) session in the
operator’s database.
4.3.3 Packet sending
Once the session has been set up, S (which is A or B) starts sending packets to
the destination D.
Figure 4.2: The packet sending phase
The `-th packet SPkt0,` sent by S contains the session ID SSID (which is
called AUSID if S = A and BUSID if S = B), the sequence number `, and the
payload Payload `. It also contains the “receipt seed” SRcpt0,` (details about the
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computation and the use of the receipts are given in Subsections 4.3.4 and 4.3.4). In
addition, S computes a MAC on the packet using the session keyK ′S and encrypts
the body of the packet (including the MAC) by XORing it with the pad PADS,`:
SPkt0,` = [ SSID | SRcpt0,` | ` | Body0,` ]
where SRcpt0,` = MACK′S (SSID | `)
and Body0,` = PADS,` ⊕ [ Payload ` |MACK′S (SSID | ` | Payload `) ]
The pads PAD i,` are generated by node i (i = S for the source) as follows
(see Figure 4.3): The session ID SSID (DSID for the down-stream nodes) and
K ′i are used as a seed to initialize the key stream generator of the stream cipher.
Then, PAD i,` is chosen as the `-th block of length MaxLength of the generated
key stream, whereMaxLength denotes the maximum allowed length of packets in
bytes. If the length L` of the packet to be encrypted is smaller than MaxLength ,
then only the last L` bytes of PAD i,` are used, the rest of PAD i,` is thrown away.
Figure 4.3: Encryption of the packets
The node i in the up-stream route (route between S and BSS ) verifies that the
packet is not a duplicate, updates (and stores) the receipt4 SRcpt i,` (details are in
Subsection 4.3.4) and encrypts the body of the packet using the pad PAD i,`:
SPkt i,` = [ SSID | SRcpt i,` | ` | Body i,` ]
where SRcpt i,` = MACK′i(SSID | SRcpt i−1,`)
and Body i,` = PAD i,` ⊕ Body i−1,`
When BSS receives the packet, it retrieves the session keys of the nodes on
the up-stream route, recomputes the pads and removes all encryptions from the
packet. If the resulting packet verifies correctly (i.e., it is not a duplicate and it has
4The receipt SRcpt i,` can be used by node i as a proof that it correctly received the packet
SPkt i,` (see Subsection 4.3.4 for more details).
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a valid MAC), the packet is forwarded5 to the base station of the destination BSD ,
otherwise it is dropped. BSD changes the up-stream session ID to the correspond-
ing down-stream session ID DSID (which is BDSID if S = A and ADSID if
S = B), computes a new MAC for D, computes the pad PADj,` for each node j
on the down-stream route (route between BSD and D), including D, and encrypts
the packet (including the MAC) by iteratively XORing it with all these pads. The
result is:
DPkt0,` = [ DSID | ` | Body0,` ] where
Body0,` = PAD1,` ⊕ . . .⊕ PADd,` ⊕ PADD,`
⊕[ Payload ` |MACK′D(DSID | ` | Payload `) ]
BSD stores MACK′D(DSID | ` | Payload `) of every packet it sends together
with the sequence number ` in order to be able to verify future destination acknowl-
edgements and packet receipts. Note that for the down stream, we do not need to
add a field dedicated to the receipt; the receipt is generated using several fields of
the down-stream packet (see Subsection 4.3.4).
Upon reception of DPkt j−1,`, each node j computes and stores the receipt
DRcpt j,` for the packet (as explained in Subsection 4.3.4), decrypts the body of
DPkt j−1,` by XORing it with the pad PADj,`, and forwards the result DPkt j,` to
the next hop where:
DPkt j,` = [ DSID | ` | Bodyj,` ] and Bodyj,` = PADj,` ⊕ Bodyj−1,`
When the packet reachesD, it removes the remaining encryption pad by XOR-
ing the packet with PADD,`. D can then verify the validity of the MAC generated
by BSD and store the MAC and ` for the generation of the acknowledgement (see
Subsection 4.3.4). Note that for up-stream and down-stream packets, removing the
encryptions and verifying the correctness of the resulting packet implicitly identi-
fies the forwarding nodes and ensures that the packet took the right route.
4.3.4 Payment Redemption
Charging
As we have already mentioned in Subsection 4.2.2, charging and remunera-
tion are performed by the network operator, by manipulating the accounts of the
nodes. When BSS receives the packet Pkt` of length L` sent by the source S,
the up-stream forwarding nodes are credited α(L`) and the initiator A is charged
5The packet is forwarded only if it is a data packet. The treatment of up-stream acknowledgement
packets is presented in Subsection 4.3.4.
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n(L`). Both α(L`) and n(L`) depend on the packet size and not on the number of
forwarding nodes in the path. The operator will then take a loss for long routes but
will make a profit from short routes. The charges and rewards should thus be set
so that – relative to the average path length – the operator makes the desired profit.
The down-stream forwarding nodes are credited when Pkt` is acknowledged
by D (see Subsection 4.3.4) because the operator may have no other reliable in-
formation about the delivery of the packet. The only incentive for D to not send
the acknowledgement is to save resources. In order to discourage this misbehavior,
D is charged a small amount ε when BSD injects Pkt` in the down-stream route
and is reimbursed when Pkt` is acknowledged. Note that, as the operator cannot
distinguish between a packet loss and the case where D does not want to send the
acknowledgment, it keeps the charge ε if no acknowledgement arrives for Pkt`.
If the packet is dropped or lost in the up-stream route, the nodes that relayed it
can present the receipt for this packet (see Subsection 4.3.4) to the operator. The
operator identifies the last node k (1 ≤ k ≤ u) in the path who sent a valid receipt
for the packet and gives it a reward β(Lmin), whereas the nodes that are before k
in the path receive a reward α(Lmin), where Lmin denotes the minimum length
of a packet. This choice of reward is made because if the reward is higher than
α(Lmin), the forwarding nodes may be tempted to drop short packets in order to
get higher rewards than the ones they would get if they forward them. A is charged
n′(Lmin) = (k − 1) · α(Lmin) + β(Lmin). Receiving β(Lmin) can be perceived
by k as its reward for informing the operator that the nodes 1 to k − 1 in the path
behaved properly. The β-reward should be sufficiently large to strongly counterbal-
ance the cost c of forwarding the packet and the cost c′ of maintaining and sending
the receipt (β  c and β  c′). The α-reward should also be substantially larger
than β (α  β) to prevent nodes from systematically dropping packets. Note that
even if c and c′ are not constants (e.g., they depend on the battery level of the node),
we can choose the α and β-reward in such a way that the conditions listed above
are fulfilled.
If the packet is dropped or lost in the down-stream route, the nodes that relayed
it are rewarded in a similar way as for the up-stream forwarding nodes, except for
α(Lmin) and β(Lmin) that are replaced by α(L`) and β(L`), respectively, because
the operator received the packet and knows its real length L`. The initiator A is
fully charged n(L`).
Destination acknowledgement
The destination D must acknowledge every packet it correctly receives. How-
ever, in order to save resources, it does not send acknowledgements on a per packet
basis. Instead, the session is subdivided into “time periods” and the packets re-
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ceived during each period are acknowledged in a single batch. The acknowledg-
ment DAck t of the t-th time period of the session is formatted as the payload of a
regular packet6 and sent by D via the down-stream route to BSD:
DAck t = [ Batcht | DFPkt t | DLPkt t | DLost t |
MACK′D(Batcht | DFPkt t | DLPkt t | DLost t) ]
where DFPkt t and DLPkt t are the sequence numbers of, respectively, the first
and the last received packets during the t-th time period, DLost t is the list of the
missing packets between DFPkt t and DLPkt t and
Batcht =
⊕
DFPktt≤`≤DLPktt; ` 6∈DLostt
MACK′D(DSID | ` | Payload `)
whereMACK′D(DSID | ` | Payload `) is the MAC received in the packet Pkt `.
The packet is forwarded as a regular packet of the session. WhenBSD receives
it, the packet is decrypted and identified as being an acknowledgement. Then,BSD
verifies the MAC and checks Batcht by XORing all the MACs of the packets from
DFPkt t to DLPkt t, excluding those in DLost t and comparing the result with the
received value. If the verification fails, then BSD ignores the acknowledgement. If
BSD does not receiveDAck t during the t+1-th time period or if the throughput is
not satisfactory (i.e., too many lost packets), an alternative route is used to establish
a new session.
Up-stream acknowledgment
To attenuate the effect of several malicious attacks (see Section 4.5), the base
station BSS sends a single acknowledgment UAck t to S for all the packets it re-
ceived during the t-th time period of the session. UAck t is sent in a regular packet
and its format is similar to the format of DAck t, except that the base station does
not have to provide a Batch-like proof to the source:
UAck t = [ UFPkt t | ULPkt t | ULost t |
MACK′S (UFPkt t | ULPkt t | ULost t) ]
When S receives UAck t, it identifies it as being an acknowledgement and
checks its validity by verifying its MAC. S can choose to re-establish the session
to BSS using an alternative route if no acknowledgement arrives for a given time
period or if the throughput is unsatisfactory.
6It is necessary to be able to differentiate between a data packet and an acknowledgement (e.g.,
by using a flag bit).
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Packet receipts
The concept of receipt we use in this work is similar to the one used in [89].
It does not represent a proof that the node forwarded the packet but rather that it
received it correctly. As we will see in Subsection 4.4, the use of the receipts helps
to make packet forwarding rational.
For an up-stream forwarding node i, the receipt SRcpt i,` for the packet Pkt` is
sent together with the payload and it is computed as explained in Subsection 4.3.3.
We need a field dedicated to the receipt in the up-stream part of the communication,
because if a part of the packet is used to compute the receipt, BSS has no way to
verify it in the case of packet loss, which is the very purpose of the receipts. For
a down-stream forwarding node j, the receipt DRcpt j,` is computed as follows:
DRcpt j,` = MACK′j (DSID |Mj,`) where Mj,` represents the MAC field of the
packetDPkt j,`. It is possible for the operator to verify the receipts because it stores
the MACs of the packets (they are also used to compute/verify the destination
acknowledgements).
In order to save memory space, both up- and down-stream forwarding nodes do
not store the receipts for each packet but rather for a whole session; the forward-
ing node i stores a batch for each session it is involved in as a forwarding node:
BatchSID,i =
⊕
`≤LPkt ;` 6∈Lost Rcpt i,` where LPkt is the sequence number of the
last packet received so far and Lost is the set of the sequence numbers of missing
packets preceding LPkt .
Note that for a node in the initiator route, AUSID and ADSID correspond to
two distinct sessions. When a given session is closed and the last destination ac-
knowledgement is sent, the operator informs the forwarding nodes, typically when
the node is within the power range of a base station, about the rewards they re-
ceived (e.g., using a packet similar to the up-stream acknowledgement). If a node i
forwarded a packet Pkt` and was not paid for it, i sends the receipt to the operator.
If the receipt is valid, the node is rewarded as explained in Subsection 4.3.4. A
single receipt is sent to ask remuneration for several packets:
RcptSID,i = [ SID | BatchSID,i | LPkt | Lost |
MACK′i(SID | BatchSID,i | LPkt | Lost) ]
Upon reception of this message, the operator verifies the MAC and if the veri-
fication is positive, it remunerates the node according to the rewarding scheme (see
Subsection 4.3.4). Note that a node can ask for remuneration (by sending the re-
ceipt) even if it did not provide the service; this attack is studied in Subsection 4.4.
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4.4 Analysis of the Incentive Mechanism
The aim of the incentive mechanism we propose in this chapter is to make
forwarding packets for other nodes rational. In order to assess the efficiency of our
solution, we analyze the Packet Dropping attack where an attacker A, that is part
of the end-to-end route between S and D, decides to drop a packet it is asked to
forward. In this section, we consider the effect of the attack on the different phases
of our protocols and we show that this attack is not rational. This result proves,
particularly for the packet sending phase, that our solution fosters cooperation.
Session setup phase: A can drop one or several of the following messages:
• The request message: The sender of the request (which is A or BSB) does
not receive the confirmation or the reply message, respectively. It then es-
tablishes a new session to the target (BSA and B, respectively) using an
alternative route. Note that dropping the request message is not necessarily
an attack because the forwarding nodes can decide to not participate in a
given session.
• The reply message: BSB never receives the reply and the correspondent
session setup fails. It then uses another route to establish the correspondent
session.
• The confirmation message: Some of the nodes involved in the communi-
cation are not aware of the establishment of the session. If the initiator A
is the source of the first packet to be sent during the session, we can have
two cases: (i) A is in the initiator route, therefore A does not receive the
confirmation message and considers that the session setup failed; it then es-
tablishes a new session using another route. (ii) A is in the correspondent
route, the session is then active for all the nodes, except for those that are
after A in the correspondent route (including B); these nodes discard all the
packets sent by A during the session. B is thus unable to send the periodic
acknowledgment to BSB and the session is re-established.
The problem is totally symmetric if B is the source of the first packet of the
session. In both cases, this attack is not rational and can be detected rapidly
by the operator.
Packet sending phase: We show here that denying to forward packets is not
rational; cooperation is thus the best choice for a selfish, rational node.
Proposition 1 If a node i received a packet Pkt` to forward and if, later on, Pkt`
was not acknowledged by the target (BSS for the up-stream and D for the down-
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stream), then it is rational for i, once the session is closed, to send a receipt for
Pkt` to the network operator.
Proof: As explained in Subsection 4.3.4, after a given session is closed, the
operator informs the nodes involved in that session about the rewards they received.
If a node i correctly forwarded (or simply received) Pkt` and was not paid for it, i
can send a receipt for it.
Sending a receipt Rcpt of length LRcpt (see Section 4.6 for numerical values)
represents a cost of c′/NumPkts per packet, where NumPkts denotes the number
of packets received by i during the session and c′ denotes the cost of sending Rcpt .
Given the assumption of route stability (see Subsection 4.2.1), it is possible to
neglect c′/NumPkts in comparison with c (and thus in comparison with α and β)
because NumPkts is large.
If i decides not to send a receipt for Pkt` or if it sends an invalid receipt, then
its payoff is:
• 0 if i dropped Pkt` during the packet sending phase,
• −c if it forwarded Pkt` but none of the following nodes sent a valid receipt
for it,
• α− c if it forwarded the packet and at least one of the following nodes in the
path sent a valid receipt for the packet.
If i sends a valid receipt for Pkt`, then its payoff is:
• β if i dropped Pkt` during the packet sending phase,
• β−c if it forwarded Pkt` but none of the following nodes sent a valid receipt
for it,
• α− c if it forwarded the packet and at least one of the following nodes in the
path sent a valid receipt for the packet.
Given that (i) a forwarding node cannot know if the receipt is valid or not before
sending it to the operator, (ii) the cost of sending the receipt is negligible and (iii)
α β  c, we can state that sending the receipt is rational. 2
Proposition 2 If all the nodes involved in the communication are rational, then
forwarding the packet Pkt` is rational for node i.
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Proof: As we will show in Subsection 4.5.2, the filtering attack is malicious.
As the nodes involved in the communication are rational, they will not perform this
attack on the packets they are asked to forward and thus the receipts produced by
the intermediate nodes will be correct.
If node i decides to defect and drops a packet Pkt` it is asked to forward, i will
still send a receipt for Pkt` since, according to Proposition 1, this is the rational
behavior. The payoff of i would then be β.
If i decides to cooperate, then:
• If Pkt` reaches its target, then the payoff of i is α− c,
• If, on the contrary, Pkt` does not reach its target, then at least one node j
(j > i) will send a receipt for it (according to Proposition 1) and the payoff
of i is also α− c.
As we have α β  c, cooperation is rational for node i. 2
Proposition 3 If the route contains an attacker that repeatedly drops the packet
Pkt`, then the network operator can identify it.
Proof: As long as Pkt` is relayed by rational nodes, the packet is computed and
correctly forwarded until it reaches the malicious nodeA that drops it. The rational
nodes that are beforeA in the path will then send valid receipts for Pkt` (according
to Proposition 1). The operator identifies the last node k in the path that sent a
valid receipt, which is A or the rational node that is before it on the route (because
A is also able to generate a valid receipt for the packet). The operator suspects
then both k and k + 1 of misbehavior. By crosschecking the information about
different sessions and identifying the nodes that are suspected significantly more
than average, the operator can identify the attacker and punish it in consequence.
Note that if A performed this attack only a few times, then the detection would be
slower but the attack would be less harmful. 2
Proposition 4 Forwarding the packet Pkt` is rational for node i even if an at-
tacker A will drop it later on.
Proof: Node i has no information about whether the nodes after it in the path
are rational or not. If it expects all of them to be rational, then the best choice for i is
to cooperate (according to Proposition 2). If it expects node i+1 to be rational, then
the best choice for i is to cooperate (its payoff would be α − c because according
to Proposition 1, i + 1 would send a receipt for the packet). Finally, if it expects
node i+ 1 to be malicious and drop the packet, then the best choice for i is also to
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cooperate, because otherwise the operator would eventually believe it is malicious
(according to Proposition 3) and would punish it. 2
Payment redemption phase: The acknowledgement is encapsulated in a reg-
ular packet and the body is encrypted by all the nodes in the path, including the
generator of the acknowledgement. An attacker A has thus no way to distinguish
a packet containing an acknowledgement from a data packet, especially if some
padding is used to prevent the acknowledgement packet from having a fixed and
predefined length. A brute force attack would be for A, in order to specifically
drop the t-th acknowledgement, to drop all the packets sent during the t + 1-th
time period. The consequence of this attack is the re-establishment of the session
using another route.
4.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we study the robustness of our set of protocols against the active
attacks identified in Subsection 4.2.3.
4.5.1 Replay attack
We consider that a replay attack performed by an attackerA is successful if the
replayed message or packet is considered as valid by all the parties involved in the
communication (including the operator). Note that A is not necessarily part of the
network. In this Subsection, we will show that this attack is malicious and never
successful.
Session setup phase: The operator maintains the information about all the
sessions established so far. The replayed message (request, reply or confirmation)
is thus detected by the first base station that receives it. A detection at the nodes is
also possible; when a node i receives a replayed request message, it can identify it
as a duplicate (and discard it) if:
• i is not part of the route in the request,
• or i is supposed to be the initiator of the communication,
• or the session to be established is already active or it is closed but still in
memory. Indeed, even if the mobile nodes do not keep track of all the mes-
sages and packets they received, they do maintain a short-term history (i.e.,
on-going sessions and session that are not acknowledged yet).
Packet sending phase: As for the session setup phase, the duplicate is detected
by the first base station that receives it. But here, the intermediate nodes are also
86 Cooperation in Hybrid Ad-hoc Networks
able to detect it because each forwarding node maintains the list of all packets it
has received so far (for the computation of the receipt, see Subsection 4.3.4). The
sequence number of the packet to forward corresponds then to the identifier of an
already handled packet and the duplicate is discarded.
Payment redemption phase: The operator maintains the list of all acknowl-
edgements and receipts it receives and can thus detect (and discard) a replayed
message. Furthermore, as explained in Subsection 4.4, it is difficult to identify the
packets containing the acknowledgements and thus to replay them specifically.
4.5.2 Filtering attack
An attacker A that performs a filtering attack modifies one or several fields
of the packet it is asked to forward. In this subsection, we analyse the effect of
this attack on our protocols. We also consider the free-riding attack where two
colluders A1 and A2, on the end-to-end route, attempt to piggyback data (using
appending or substitution) on the exchanged packets, with the goal of not having
to pay for the communication.
Session setup phase: A can tamper with:
• The request or the reply messages: The verification of the “layered” MAC
fails and the base station (BSA orBSB) discards the message. A new session
is then established using an alternative route.
• The confirmation message: The first node that receives the tampered mes-
sage discards it because the verification of the MAC fails. IfA tampers with
one (or more) MAC(s) in the message, the first node whose MAC was modi-
fied and that receives the message discards it. This attack has the same effect
as dropping the confirmation message (see Subsection 4.4) and is detected
in the same way.
The fields of the session setup messages are not encrypted. It is then possible
for two colludersA1 andA2 to piggyback information. However, the size of fields
is small enough to make the sending of useful data very long and fastidious.
Packet sending phase: A can tamper with the different fields of the packet
Pkt `.
• Modifying SID , ` or Body i,` is detected by the target of the packet (BSS for
the up-stream andD for the down-stream) because the “layered” MAC does
not verify correctly.
• We hereafter define the early duplicate attack, a malicious attack where A
creates a fake packet with a sequence number ` that it expects to be used by
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the legitimate source in the (near) future. This packet is considered as valid
by the intermediate nodes (because they cannot verify it) but it is discarded
at the target because the MAC is not correct. However, when the source
sends the “real” `-th packet, the forwarding nodes consider it as a duplicate
and thus discard it. Our protocols, as presented so far, are vulnerable to this
attack. If the operator wants to attenuate the effect of this subtle attack, it
can do so (at the cost of a small overhead) by making use of hash chains
(i.e., a chain of N hash values where wN is chosen at random, wN−i =
h(wN−i+1), 0 < i ≤ N , and h is a one-way hash function).
Let us first describe the solution for the initiator session. During the ses-
sion setup phase, the base station BSA sends the first hash values AUw0
and ADw0 of two sufficiently long hash chains, in the initiator confirmation
message, to the nodes in the initiator route (including A). BSA also sends
the hash value AUwm encrypted with the secret key of A in the confirma-
tion. A can thus retrieve the elements 0 to m of the hash chain and send
the hash value AUw ` (1 ≤ ` ≤ m) with the `-th packet it generates7. BSA
sends the hash value ADw ` with the `-th packet it sends toward A. The in-
termediate nodes can verify the validity of the hash values by checking that
w0 = h`(w`) (w = AUw or ADw ). The verification of the hash value can
be optimized if we use mechanisms such as [28] for example. The packets
containing invalid hash values are discarded.
The solution is totally symmetric for the correspondent session. Note here
that given w`, one can retrieve the hash values of all the previous packets in
the session. This means that packets out of order should be discarded. But
this constraint is logical in our case because we use the notion of sessions.
All the packets are then expected to go through the same route and to arrive
in order; the contrary is thus suspicious.
The use of the hash values can also solve the case where the attacker tampers
only withw`; the attack is detected at the first node that receives the modified
packet because the checking of the hash value fails.
Modifying both w` and ` is an even more subtle malicious attack. Let us
assume that a forwarding node receives the packets Pkt `−1 and Pkt ` to for-
ward. It discards Pkt `−1 and replaces the sequence number and the hash
value in Pkt ` by ` − 1 and w`−1, respectively. The sequence number and
the hash value are considered as valid by the following forwarding nodes.
7When A is about to run out of hash values, the base station provides it (in the same way the
up-stream acknowledgment is sent) with a hash value AUwm+n. A can then compute n new valid
hash values.
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Of course, the packet is discarded at the target because the MAC is not cor-
rect. The attack is possible if the attacker is part of the route and thus all the
nodes on the route are suspected by the operator. The first direct effect of
this attack is for the source to cancel the session, because the throughput is
too low; the second effect is that the operator eventually, by crosschecking
the information about the suspected nodes, identifies the attacker.
• The free-riding attack is not rational during the packet sending phase; the
data sent byA1 cannot be interpreted byA2 because it was encrypted at least
by one intermediate node8. If this attack is performed anyway, it is detected
as a “regular” filtering or packet dropping attack (depending on whether A2
forwarded the tampered packet or not).
• Modifying only the receipt SRcpt in the up-stream packets (there is no field
dedicated to receipts in the down-stream packets) is a malicious attack. If the
base station BSS detects such an attack (the packet is correct but the receipt
is not), then it re-establishes the session (if S = B) or asks the initiator to
do it (if S = A). Such a radical solution is needed because, as explained in
Subsection 4.3.4, the nodes maintain one batch per session by XORing all
the receipts of the packets they handled. If one of these receipts is incorrect,
then the batch is incorrect and the receipt does not verify correctly at the
operator.
• The attacker A can tamper with the packet it is asked to forward but without
altering the fields used by the intermediate nodes to generate the receipts.
The following nodes in the route forward the modified packet. When the
target (BSS or D) receives it, it detects the attack and re-establishes the
session.
Payment redemption phase: This attack is similar to the packet dropping
attack during the payment redemption phase.
4.5.3 Emulation and Node Duplication Attacks
This attack is equivalent to the cloning of a SIM card in a GSM cellular net-
work and can be detected in the same way; a node claiming to be in several physical
locations simultaneously (e.g., it is in two geographically distinct cells) is automat-
ically suspected by the operator. Furthermore, statistical methods can be used to
8Having two colluding nodes that are neighbors and that perform the free-riding attack makes no
sense because they can communicate directly with each other.
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determine whether certain nodes relay more traffic than is reasonable, given the
type of the node. Either of these events suggests that the device is dishonest.
The same analysis holds for the node duplication attack.
4.5.4 Denial of Service Attack
In this attack, A prevents two or more nodes from communicating, e.g., by
jamming the wireless channel.. This attack is malicious and solving it may re-
quire human involvement (e.g., the operator identifies the jamming device and, if
possible, removes it).
4.5.5 Intrusion Attack
In this attack, A is an unauthorized node but it manages to be accepted in the
network as a valid node. This attack is not possible against our system. Indeed, if
A is an unauthorized node, the authentication of A by the base station would fail
and A will never be able to send or receive packets, or to be part of a route.
4.5.6 Hybrid attacks
Sophisticated attacks can combine two or more of the attacks described so far.
For example, two colluders A1 and A2 that are on the same route may want to
perform, respectively, the filtering attack and the packet dropping attack. If the
filtering attack does not modify the information needed by the intermediate nodes
to compute the receipts, the operator will detect a “regular” packet dropping attack
and will identify A2 as being the attacker (see the proof of Proposition 3). If, on
the contrary, the nodes that are between A1 and A2 are not able to generate valid
receipts, then A1 will be identified by the operator as an attacker that performed a
filtering attack (see the Appendix). The same reasoning can be applied to the case
where there are more than two colluders.
4.5.7 Securing the routing protocol
As stated in Subsection 4.2.4, even if the underlying routing protocol is not
secure, the operator is able to detect several routing attacks. Indeed, during the ses-
sion setup, the initiator and correspondent routes are tested and the nodes belonging
to these routes are authenticated, which allows the operator to detect attacks such
as routing loops or invalid routes. However, some routing attacks cannot be de-
tected before the packet sending phase (e.g., Sybil Attack, Black hole or Gray hole
attacks [49]); the network operator can then employ statistical methods to detect
them. Note that securing the routing protocol is out of the scope of this work; we
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therefore consider, to exemplify, the following attacks that we believe are the most
pertinent regarding our solution:
Sybil Attack attack: In this attack, the adversary makes the route appear longer
by adding virtual nodes [49]. The operator determines statistically if the set of
intermediate nodes is inconsistent (e.g., an emulated node is in the route or an
attacker is performing the wormhole attack) or if the route is much too long (a
route in Hybrid Ad-hoc networks is not expected to be long, having a too long
routes is therefore suspicious). The operator can also suspect such an attack if two
or more nodes seem to be always neighbors, despite mobility. More heuristics can
be found in [52].
Black or gray holes attack: This attack is similar to the packet dropping attack
during the packet sending phase.
4.6 Overhead
In this section, we estimate the communication and computation overheads
of the solution we have described. Reasonable values of the size of the different
fields appearing in our protocol are provided in Table 4.1. NbFwdrs is the number
of forwarding nodes on the route (up-stream or down-stream), ` is the sequence
number of the packet and NbLostPkts is the number of packets lost during the
session or the time period.
Field Name ReqID SID TrafficInfo Route
Size (bytes) 4 4 16 NbFwdrs*16
Field Name MAC ` SRcpt Lost
Size (bytes) 16 2 1 NbLostPkts*2
Table 4.1: Size of the fields used in our protocol (for both up and down streams)
The request ID and the session IDs are encoded on 4 bytes each to reduce
the risk of using the same identifier for two different requests or sessions. The field
Route is the concatenation of the 16 byte identifiers (assuming e.g. an IPv6 format)
of the nodes. The TrafficInfo field is used to inform the forwarding nodes about the
traffic to be generated; using 16 bytes to encode it seems to be reasonable. Finally,
we encode ` on 2 bytes to support long sessions and SRcpt on only 1 byte because
its computation and storage should be lightweight.
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4.6.1 Communication Overhead
Session Setup Phase: According to Table 4.1, establishing an end-to-end ses-
sion with NbFwdrs forwarding nodes (in each of the routes) represents an over-
head of 156 +NbFwdrs ∗ 64 bytes.
The session setup overhead is directly related to the lifetime of the sessions,
which, in turn, very much depends on the stability of the routes.
Description of the simulations: We consider a network composed of 100 nodes
laid out on a 500x500 m2 single cell and one base station situated in the center
of the cell. We fix the power range of the nodes and the base station to 100 m.
We use the random waypoint mobility model [54] with a 0 s pause time and we
discard the first 1000 seconds of simulation time to remove the initial transient
phase [26]. We perform 3 sets of simulations where the speed is uniformly chosen
between x and 10 m/s, x = 2, 3 and 4 m/s [85], which corresponds to an average
speed AvrSpeed = 5.6, 6.7 and 7.8 respectively; we run 100 simulations for each
value of AvrSpeed. As we are interested in the lifetime of the routes and not in
communication interface, our simulation is written in plain C++ instead of ns-2.
Figures of interest: In our simulations we are interested in the two following
figures:
• The average lifetime of a route (AvrLT): After the initial transient phase of
each simulation, we randomly choose a node that has a route to the local
base station (we choose the shortest path, the effect of mobility on the per-
formance of more sophisticated routing protocols is discussed in [6]) and we
observe the lifetime of this route. The simulation ends when at least one
link on the route is broken. AvrLT represents the average value of all these
lifetime values over the 100 simulations.
• The average number of forwarding nodes (NbFwdrs): This number is com-
puted for the node we consider for the AvrLT.
Results: The results, given in Table 4.2, show that the stability of the routes
decreases with higher mobility of forwarding nodes. For AvrLT, we consider a 95%
confidence interval (CI).
In order to estimate the amount of information that a node can send during this
period of time, let us consider the case where the nodes are running a Voice over
IP application using a G.711 Codec (Rate = 64 kbit/s) with a frame size (including
the headers) of 200 bytes [37]. If we consider that the average speed = 7.8 m/s,
the route remains stable for an average of 7.8 s; it is possible during this period to
send 62.4 kbytes of data. The overhead of an end-to-end session setup is 252 bytes
(the average number of forwarding nodes is 1.5), which represents only 0.4% of
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AvrSpeed NbFwdrs AvrLT (s) 95% CI
5.6m/s 1.3 10.7 2.1
6.7m/s 1.4 8.1 1.7
7.8m/s 1.5 7.8 1.5
Table 4.2: Simulation results for the different values of the speed (pause time=0 s)
the amount of information (payload) that is possible to send during the session.
Moreover, as explained in Subsection 4.3.2, it is possible to re-establish only the
broken session (the initiator session or the correspondent session), which reduces
this overhead.
The presence of one (or more) active malicious attackers in the end-to-end
route can also lead to a session re-establishment. However, the operator can sta-
tistically identify the attacker(s) (see Section 4.5); the risk of being identified and
punished represents a disincentive to cheat.
Packet Sending Phase: Considering the field sizes of Table 4.1, we can see
that the packet sending phase represents an overhead of 23 bytes for up-stream
packets and 22 bytes for down-stream packets. If the packet size is 200 bytes
(considering again the VoIP example), the overhead represents at most 11.5% of
the packet size. This overhead is reduced if we use larger packets.
Sending the Acknowledgment: The destination acknowledgement and the
up-stream acknowledgement are generated each time period and their sizes are
36+2*NbLostPktst bytes and 20+2*NbLostPktst bytes, respectively. The receipt
RcptSID,i is a 23+2*NbLostPkts bytes message that the node i sends directly (i.e.,
without relaying) to the operator once per session. We expect the number of packets
lost to be small in both cases (i.e., acknowledgement and receipt), otherwise the
session is re-established because the throughput is not satisfactory.
4.6.2 Computation Overhead
In this subsection, we consider the computation overhead for the mobile nodes.
The overhead is expressed in terms of battery consumption and number of compu-
tations. However, as shown in [73], we can consider the battery consumption, due
to cryptographic computations, as negligible compared to the energy needed for
data transmission.
Session Setup Phase: This operation requires all the nodes to perform 1 MAC
computation and 1 MAC verification each.
Packet Sending Phase: For each packet, the source and the destination have
to perform one MAC operation each. However, the main overhead in this phase
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is represented by the usage of stream cipher encryption (performed by the source
and all the forwarders), which ensures the authentication of the nodes involved in
the communication and prevents the free-riding attack. But stream ciphers are very
fast, and some operate at a speed comparable to that of 32 bit CRC computation
[44].
Acknowledgment computation: For the destination acknowledgement, D
performs one MAC computation/time period and one XOR operation/packet. For
the up-stream acknowledgement, S performs one MAC verification per time pe-
riod. Finally, for the receipts, each forwarding node performs one MAC computa-
tion/time period and one XOR operation/packet.
Numerical example: As an example, a Celeron 850 MHz processor under
Windows 2000 SP can perform aMAC computation (and verification) with HMAC/
MD5 algorithm at 99.863 Mbytes/s and a stream cipher encryption (and decryp-
tion) using Panama Cipher (little endian) algorithm at 120.301 Mbytes/s [44].
These numbers provide an order of magnitude; if slower (or faster) processors are
used, they would of course scale correspondingly.
4.7 Related work
In this section, we discuss some research efforts related to the issues of the coop-
eration of nodes in (pure) Ad-hoc networks and in Hybrid Ad-hoc networks.
Cooperation in Ad-hoc networks: Several research groups have considered
the problem of selfishness and the stimulation of cooperation in mobile ad-hoc
networks. In [34], Fe´legyha´zi et al. establish the connection between the ad-hoc
network topology and the possible existence of cooperation. In [64], Marti et al.
consider the case where a node agrees to cooperate but fails to do so. Their solution
uses a “watchdog” mechanism to identify the misbehaving nodes and a “pathrater”
mechanism to construct routes that avoid those nodes. Both the CONFIDANT [22]
and the CORE [66] approaches propose a reputation based solution to identify and
punish misbehaving nodes. In [89], Zhong et al. rely on a central authority that
collects receipts from the forwarding nodes and charges/rewards the nodes based
on these receipts. In [24], Buttya´n and Hubaux use a virtual currency/credits to
charge/reward the packet forwarding service provision in ad-hoc networks.
Cooperation in Hybrid Ad-hoc networks: In [60], Lamparter et al. propose
a rewarding scheme to encourage cooperation in hybrid networks (i.e., mobile ad-
hoc networks with access to the Internet, which they call “stub ad-hoc networks”).
They assume the existence of an Internet Service Provider that authenticates the
nodes involved in a given communication and takes care of charging or rewarding
them. However, [60] and our current approach present two main differences. First
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of all, in [60], the authors analyse the robustness of their solution only against
rational attacks, whereas in our proposal we consider malicious attacks as well.
The second difference is that the cryptographic functions used in [60] are based on
public-key cryptography, whereas our solution is based solely on symmetric key
cryptography, which is more suitable for resource constrained mobile devices.
In [53], we have proposed a micro-payment scheme for Hybrid Ad-hoc net-
works that encourages collaboration in packet forwarding. However, our current
proposal significantly differs from [53] in many aspects. First of all, in [53], we as-
sume an asymmetric communication model, where the up-stream communication
is potentially multi-hop and the down-stream communication is always single-hop,
whereas in this work, both the up-stream and the down-stream communications are
potentially multi-hop. Second, in [53], the nodes report a fraction of their packet
forwarding actions (on a probabilistic basis) to an accounting center that conse-
quently remunerates the nodes. The approach we propose here does not rely on
reports; instead, we use the concept of session during which each forwarding node
authenticates itself to the base station by altering the packet to be forwarded in
a specific way. Finally, the protocol proposed in [53] includes routing decisions,
whereas the protocols that we propose in this work are independent of routing.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a set of protocols that fosters cooperation for the
packet forwarding service in Hybrid Ad-hoc networks. Our solution is based on the
charging and rewarding of the nodes and relies exclusively on symmetric cryptog-
raphy to comply with the limited resources of most mobile stations. We have used
the concept of sessions, which takes advantage of the relative stability of routes,
and we have shown that our scheme stimulates cooperation in Hybrid Ad-hoc net-
works. Finally, we have analyzed the robustness of our protocols against various
attacks and have shown that our solution thwarts rational attacks and detects mali-
cious attacks.
As future work, we intend to consider techniques that aim at the calibration of
the relevant parameters, and to study the reaction of the network to sophisticated
attacks (e.g., by means of simulations). We will also explore further the statistical
detection, at the operator, of malicious attacks and we will study the coexistence of
several operators.
Publications:[11, 12]
Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have considered three families of networks; WiFi networks,
Wireless Mesh Networks, and Hybrid Ad-hoc networks. For each of these fami-
lies, we have identified important network functions that require the cooperation
of different entities in the network and we have proposed a secure, lightweight and
efficient incentive mechanism.
For WiFi networks, we have proposed a solution where the mobile clients co-
operatively build a reputation system that encourages the Wireless Internet Service
Providers to cooperate (i.e., to provide the clients with a good Quality of Service).
Our solution also allows the mobile users to connect to foreign WISPs in a secure
way while preserving its anonymity. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme
is the only one that is secure, encourages the WISPs to behave well and offers a
seamless roaming mechanism, and all for a moderate overhead for the the mobile
clients. We have analyzed the robustness of our solution against various attacks
and we have shown by means of simulations that our reputation model indeed en-
courages the WISPs to behave correctly.
ForWirelessMesh networks, we have proposed FAME, a fair scheduling mech-
anism that optimizes the bandwidth utilization and maximizes the spatial reuse
(i.e., the possibility for links that do not contend to be activated at the same time)
by assigning transmission rights to the links in the network. With respect to other
proposals, FAME is collision-free and it ensures a fair share of the network re-
sources for each client in the network. We have proven that our solution is indeed
fair and collision-free, and we have evaluated its efficiency by means of Matlab
simulations and by using the Magnets outdoor testbed.
Finally, for Hybrid Ad-hoc networks, we have proposed a charging and re-
warding scheme that fosters cooperation for the packet forwarding service. The
originality of our solution resides in the fact that it is based on symmetric cryptog-
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raphy in order to cope with the limited resources of the mobile stations, that it uses
the concept of sessions, which takes advantage of the relative stability of routes,
and that it leads to a very moderate overhead. We have analyzed the robustness
of our protocols against various attacks and have shown that our solution thwarts
rational attacks and detects malicious attacks.
List of Symbols
Symbols Used Throughout the Thesis
A Attacker
UX Utility function of node X
bX Benefit received by node X
cX Cost of cooperation for node X
kX,Y Symmetric key shared between node X and node Y
n+ 1 Number of elements in a hash chain
wi, i = 0..n Elements of a hash chain. wn is the root of
the chain and wi = h(wi+1)
h Hash function used to generate the hash chain
NX Nonce generated by node X
PKX Node X’s public key
Cert(X) Certificate of the node X’s public key
EPKX (M) Encryption of message M using node X’s public key
SPKX (M) Signature of message M using node X’s public key
EkX,Y (M) Encryption of message M using the symmetric key shared
between node X and node Y
MACkX,Y (M) MAC of message M computed using the symmetric key shared
between node X and node Y
 Small amount of money used in the payment system
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Symbols Specific to Chapter 2
H Home WISP
S Selected WISP
MN Mobile Node
TCA Trusted Central Authority
RRX Reputation record of WISP X
AQX QoS advertised by WISP X
RQX The real QoS provided by WISP X
PrX Price per service part required by WISP X
tag A random number used by H to authenticateMN
C The contract established between S andMN
α,β, γ Coefficients used in the decision mechanism
Symbols Specific to Chapter 3
G Directed graph representing the Mesh Network
V Set of vertices composed of the TAPs and the WAP
L Set of links between the TAPs
LU Set of upstream links
LD Set of downstream links
`a,b Link between TAPa and TAPb
C`a,b Capacity of link `a,b
nM Number of mobile clients
M Set of mobile clients
fui Traffic flow generated by the mobile clientMi
fdi Traffic flow received by the mobile clientMi
fi Corresponds to fui if we consider upstream
traffic and to fdi if we consider downstream
traffic
T Duration of the cycle
t`a,b Duration of the activation of link `a,b
tfi`a,b Time dedicated to flow fi on link `a,b
F`i,j Set of traffic flows traversing link `i,j
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Symbols Specific to Chapter 3 (cnd)
ri Route from the TAP servingMi to the WAP
CM Compatibility matrix
Clkc The k-th clique of cardinality c
dkc Time reserved, on the cycle, for Cl
k
c
g(Clkc ) Gain associated with the clique Cl
k
c
bl Bottleneck link
A Matrix representing the network topology
Symbols Specific to Chapter 4
A Initiator of the communication
B Correspondent of the communication
S Source of a packet (could be A or B)
D Destination of a packet
BSA Base station of the initiator
BSB Base station of the correspondent
Ki Long-term symmetric key shared between node i and the operator
a Number of intermediate nodes in the initiator route
b Number of intermediate nodes in the correspondent route
α Reward for a node that can prove it forwarded a packet
β Reward for a node that can only prove it received a packet
c Cost of forwarding a packet
c′ Cost of maintaining and sending the receipt
100
Bibliography
[1] G. N. Agge´lou and R. Tafazolli. On the Relaying Capacity of Next-
Generation GSM Cellular Networks. IEEE Personal Communications,
February 2001.
[2] I. F. Akyildiz, X. Wang, and W. Wang. Wireless Mesh Networks: A Survey.
Computer Networks Journal (Elsevier), 47(4), 2005.
[3] R. Anderson and M. Kuhn. Tamper Resistance - a Cautionary Note. In The
Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce Proceedings, 1996.
[4] P. Bahl, A. Balachandran, A. Miu, W. Russell, G. Voelker, and Y.M. Wang.
PAWNs: Satisfying the Need for Ubiquitous Connectivity and Location Ser-
vices. IEEE Personal Communications Magazine (PCS), 9(1), 2002.
[5] P. Bahl, A. Balachandran, and S. Venkatachary. Secure Wireless Internet
Access in Public Places. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Commu-
nications, 2001.
[6] F. Bai, N. Sadagopan, and A. Helmy. IMPORTANT: a framework to system-
atically analyze the Impact of Mobility on Performance of RouTing protocols
for Adhoc NeTworks. In Proceedings of INFOCOM, 2003.
[7] Y. Bejerano. Efficient Integration of Multi-HopWireless andWired Networks
with QoS Constraints. In Proceedings of Mobicom, 2002.
[8] Y. Bejerano, S.-J. Han, and L. Li. Fairness and Load Balancing in Wireless
LANs Using Association Control. In Proceedings of MobiCom, 2004.
[9] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. Optimal Asymmetric Encryption – How to en-
crypt with RSA. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 950, 1995.
[10] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. The Exact Security of Digital Signatures - How
to Sign with RSA and Rabin. Advance in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT, 1070,
1996.
102
[11] N. Ben Salem, L. Buttya´n, J.-P. Hubaux, and M. Jakobsson. A Charging and
Rewarding Scheme for Packet Forwarding in Multi-hop Cellular Networks.
In Proceedings of MobiHoc, 2003.
[12] N. Ben Salem, L. Buttya´n, J.-P. Hubaux, and M. Jakobsson. Node Coopera-
tion in Hybrid Ad-hoc Networks. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
(TMC), 5(4), 2006.
[13] N. Ben Salem and J.-P. Hubaux. A Fair Scheduling for Wireless Mesh Net-
works. In Proceedings of the IEEE Workshop on Wireless Mesh Networks
(WiMesh), 2005.
[14] N. Ben Salem and J.-P. Hubaux. Securing Wireless Mesh Networks. IEEE
Wireless Communications Magazine, 13(2), 2006.
[15] N. Ben Salem, J.-P. Hubaux, and M. Jakobsson. Fuelling WiFi deployment:
A reputation-based solution. In Proceedings of the International Symposium
on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad-Hoc, and Wireless Networks
(WiOpt), 2004.
[16] N. Ben Salem, J.-P. Hubaux, and M. Jakobsson. Reputation-based Wi-Fi De-
ployment - Protocols and Security Analysis. In Proceedings of the ACM Inter-
national Workshop on Wireless Mobile Applications and Services on WLAN
Hotspots (WMash), 2004.
[17] N. Ben Salem, J.-P. Hubaux, and M. Jakobsson. Reputation-based Wi-Fi
Deployment. Mobile Computing and Communications Review (MC2R), 9(3),
2005.
[18] G. Bianchi. IEEE 802.11Saturation Throughput Analysis. IEEE Communi-
cations Letters, 2(12), 1998.
[19] P. Bjorklund, P. Varbrand, and D. Yuan. Resource Optimization of Spatial
TDMA in Ad-Hoc Radio Networks: A Column Generation Approach. In
Proceedings of INFOCOM, 2003.
[20] A. Botta, I. Matyasovszki, A. Pescape, and R. Karrer. Perfor-
mance evaluation of the Magnets backbone. Technical report, Deutsche
Telekom Laboratories and University of Napoli Federico II, 2006.
http://www.grid.unina.it/Traffic/pub/TR-DTLab-UoN-2006.pdf.
[21] R. Bruno, M. Conti, and E. Gregori. Mesh Networks: Commodity Multihop
Ad-Hoc Networks. IEEE Communications Magazine, March 2005.
103
[22] S. Buchegger and J.-Y. Le Boudec. Performance Analysis of the CONFI-
DANT Protocol: Cooperation Of Nodes - Fairness In Distributed Ad-Hoc
NeTworks. In Proceedings of MobiHOC, 2002.
[23] L. Buttya´n. Removing the Financial Incentive to Cheat in Micropayment
Schemes. IEE Electronics Letters, January 2000.
[24] L. Buttya´n and J.-P. Hubaux. Stimulating Cooperation in Self-Organizing
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. ACM/Kluwer Mobile Networks and Applications
(MONET), 8(5), 2003.
[25] J. Camp, J. Robinson, C. Steger, and E. Knightly. Measurement Driven De-
ployment of a TwoTier Urban Mesh Access Network. In Proceedings of
Mobisys, 2006.
[26] T. Camp, J. Boleng, and V. Davies. A Survey of Mobility Models for Ad-Hoc
Network Research.Wireless Communication andMobile Computing: Special
issue on Mobile Ad-Hoc Networking: Research, Trends and Applications,
2(5), 2002.
[27] N. Chiba and T. Nashizeki. Arboricity and Subgraph Listing Algorithms.
SIAM J. Comput, 14, 1985.
[28] D. Coppersmith and M. Jakobsson. Almost Optimal Hash Sequence Traver-
sal. In Proceedings of Financial Cryptography, 2002.
[29] M. Crovella and A. Bestavros. Self-Similarity in World Wide Web Traffic:
Evidence and Possible Causes. IEEE ACM Transactions on Networking, 5(6),
1997.
[30] C. Dellacrocas and P. Resnick. Online Reputation Mechanisms - A Roadmap
for Future Research. In 1st Interdisciplinary Symposium on Online Reputa-
tion Mechanism, 2003.
[31] Z. Despotovic and K. Aberer. Trust and Reputation in P2P networks. In 1st
Interdisciplinary Symposium on Online Reputation Mechanism, 2003.
[32] E.C. Efstathiou and G.C. Polyzos. A Peer-to-Peer Approach toWireless LAN
Roaming. In Proceedings of the ACM International Workshop on Wireless
Mobile Applications and Services on WLAN Hotspots (WMash), 2003.
[33] T. ElGamal. A Public-Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on
Discrete Logarithms. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, IT-31(4),
1985.
104
[34] M. Fe´legyha´zi, J.-P. Hubaux, and L. Buttya´n. Nash Equilibria of Packet For-
warding Strategies in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks. IEEE Transactions on
Mobile Computing (TMC), 5(5), 2006.
[35] V. Gambiroza, B. Sadeghi, and E. Knightly. End-to-End Performance and
Fairness in Multihop Wireless Backhaul Networks. In Proceedings of Mobi-
Com, 2004.
[36] M. Garey and D. Johnson. Computers and Intractability - A guide to the
Theory of NP-Completeness. Freeman, San Francisc, 1979.
[37] B. Goode. Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP). Proceedings of the IEEE, 90,
September 2002.
[38] J. Gronkvist. Assignment Methods for Spatial Reuse TDMA. In Proceedings
of MobiHOC, 2000.
[39] M. Gupta, P. Judge, and M. Ammar. A Reputation System for Peer-to-Peer
Networks. In Proceedings of NOSSDAV, 2003.
[40] H. Holma and A. Toskala. WCDMA for UMTS: Radio Access for Third Gen-
eration Mobile Communications. Wiley, 2002.
[41] D. Houser and J. Wooders. Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence
from eBay. Working Paper 00-01, University of Arizona, 2001.
[42] http://www.boingo.com/.
[43] http://www.deutsche-telekom-laboratories.de/∼karrer/magnets.html.
[44] http://www.eskimo.com/˜weidai/benchmarks.html.
[45] http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/.
[46] http://www.rsasecurity.com/products/securid/.
[47] Y.-C. Hu, D. Johnson, and A. Perrig. SEAD: Secure Efficient Distance Vector
Routing for Mobile Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications (WMCSA), 2002.
[48] Y.-C. Hu and A. Perrig. A Survey of Secure Wireless Ad-Hoc Routing. IEEE
Security and Privacy, special issue on Making Wireless Work, 2(3), 2004.
[49] Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. Johnson. Ariadne: A Secure On-Demand Routing
Protocol for Ad-Hoc Networks. In Proceedings of Mobicom, 2002.
105
[50] J.-P. Hubaux, Th. Gross, J.-Y. Le Boudec, and M. Vetterli. Towards Self-
Organizing Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: the Terminodes Project. IEEE Com-
munications Magazine, 39(1), 2001.
[51] S. Jain and S. R. Das. Distributed Protocols for Scheduling and Rate Control
for MaxMin Fairness in Wireless Mesh Networks. Technical report, State
University of New York at Stony brook, 2005.
[52] M. Jakobsson. Financial Instruments in Recommendation Mechanisms. In
Proceedings of Financial Cryptography, 2002.
[53] M. Jakobsson, J.-P. Hubaux, and L. Buttya´n. A Micro-Payment Scheme En-
couraging Collaboration in Multi-Hop Cellular Networks. In Proceedings of
Financial Cryptography, 2003.
[54] D. B. Johnson and D. A. Maltz. Dynamic Source Routing in Ad-Hoc Wire-
less Networks. In Imielinski and Korth, editors, Mobile Computing. Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1996.
[55] R. Karp. Reducibility Among Combinatorial Problems. Complexity of Com-
puter Computations, 85-103, 1972.
[56] R. Karrer, I. Matyasovszki, A. Botta, and A. Pescape. Experimental Evalua-
tion and Characterization of the Magnets Wireless Backbone. In Proceedings
of the ACM International Workshop on Wireless Network Testbeds, Experi-
mental evaluation and CHaracterization (WiNTECH), 2006.
[57] KaZaA Home Page, http://www.kazaa.com.
[58] Victoria W. Kipp. The battle of NIMBY. PRIMEDIA Business Magazines &
Media Inc, 2002.
[59] M. Kodialam and T. Nandagopal. Characterizing the Capacity Region in
Multi-Radio Multi-Channel Wireless Mesh Networks. In Proceedings of Mo-
biCom, 2005,.
[60] B. Lamparter, K. Paul, and D. Westhoff. Charging Support for Ad-Hoc Stub
Networks. Journal of Computer Communication, Special Issue on Internet
Pricing and Charging: Algorithms, Technology and Applications, Elsevier
Science, Summer 2003.
[61] A. Lenstra and E. Verheul. Selecting Cryptographic Key Sizes. Journal of
Cryptology: the JOURNAL of the International Association for Cryptologic
Research, 14(4), 2001.
106
[62] Y.-D. Lin and Y.-C Hsu. Multihop Cellular: A New Architecture for Wireless
Communications. In Proceedings of INFOCOM, 2000.
[63] O. Mantel, N. Scully, and A. Mawira. Radio Aspects of Hybrid Wireless
Ad-Hoc Networks. In Proceedings of VTC, 2001.
[64] S. Marti, T. Giuli, K. Lai, and M. Baker. Mitigating Routing Misbehavior in
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. In Proceedings of Mobicom, 2000.
[65] A. J. Menezes, P. Van Oorschot, and S. Vanstone. Handbook of Applied
Cryptography. CRC Press, 1997.
[66] P. Michiardi and R. Molva. Core: A Collaborative Reputation Mechanism To
Enforce Node Cooperation In Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. In Proceedings of
CMS, 2002.
[67] M. Molle and L. Klienrock. Virtual Time CSMA: Why two clocks are better
than one. IEEE transactions on Communications, 1985.
[68] S. Nelson and L. Kleinrock. Spatial TDMA: A Collision-Free Multihop
Channel Access Protocol. IEEE Transactions on Commnuications, 33(9),
1985.
[69] P. Papadimitratos and Z. Haas. Secure Routing for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks.
In Proceedings of CNDS, 2002.
[70] Boingo Wi-Fi Industry White Paper. Towards Ubiquitous Wireless Broad-
band. http://www.boingo.com/wi-fi industry basics.pdf, 2003.
[71] B. Parno, A. Perrig, and V. Gligor. Distributed Detection of Node Replication
Attacks in Sensor Networks. In Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, 2005.
[72] B. Patel and J. Crowcroft. Ticket based Service Access for the Mobile User.
In Proceedings of MobiCom, 1997.
[73] A. Perrig, R. Szewczyk, V. Wen, D. Culler, and J. D. Tygar. SPINS: Security
Protocols for Sensor Networks. In Proceedings of Mobicom, 2001.
[74] P. Resnick and R. Zeckhauser. Trust Among Strangers in Internet Transac-
tions: Empirical Analysis of eBay’s Reputation System. In NBER workshop
on empirical studies of electronic commerce, 2001.
[75] P. Resnick, R. Zeckhauser, J. Swanson, and K. Lockwood. The Value of
Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment. In ESA Conference, 2002.
107
[76] R. Rivest and A. Shamir. PayWord and MicroMint: Two simple micro-
payment schemes. Technical report, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science,
1996.
[77] A. Seshadri, A. Perrig, L. van Doorn, and P. Khosla. SWATT: SoftWare-based
ATTestation for Embedded Devices. In Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, 2004.
[78] L. Tassiulas and S. Sarkar. Maxmin Fair Scheduling in Wireless Networks.
In Proceedings of Infocom, 2002.
[79] The Emule Project, http://www.emule-project.net.
[80] E. Tomita, A. Tanaka, and H. Takahashi. The Worst-case Time Complexity
for Finding all the Cliques. Technical report, UEC-TR-CI, 1988.
[81] P. Varbrand and D. Yuan. Maximal Throughput of Spatial TDMA in Ad-Hoc
Networks. In White paper, Sept., 2003.
[82] W. Weiy, K. Suhy, B. Wangz, Y. Guy, and J. Kurosey. Passive Online Rogue
Access Point Detection Using Sequential Hypothesis Testing with TCP ACK-
Pairs. Technical report, UMass Computer Science Techincal Report, 2006.
[83] H. Wu, C. Qios, S. De, and O. Tonguz. Integrated Cellular and Ad-Hoc Re-
laying Systems: iCAR. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
19(10), 2001.
[84] W. Xu, W. Trappe, Y. Zhang, and T. Wood. The Feasibility of Launching
and Detecting Jamming Attacks in Wireless Networks. In Proceedings of
MobiHoc, 2005.
[85] J. Yoon, M. Liu, and B. Noble. Random Waypoint Considered Harmful. In
Proceedings of INFOCOM, 2003.
[86] A. N. Zadeh, B. Jabbari, R. Pickholtz, and B. Vojcic. Self-Organizing Packet
Radio Ad-Hoc Networks with Overlay (SOPRANO). IEEE Communications
Magazine, June 2002.
[87] M. Zapata and N. Asokan. Securing Ad-Hoc Routing Protocols. In Proceed-
ings of WiSe, 2002.
[88] J. Zhang, J. Li, S. Weinstein, and N. Tu. Virtual Operator Based AAA in
Wireless LAN Hot Spots with Ad-Hoc Networking Support. Mobile Com-
puting and Communications Review, 6(13), 2002.
108
[89] S. Zhong, Y. R. Yang, and J. Chen. Sprite: A Simple, Cheat-Proof, Credit-
Based System for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. In Proceedings of INFOCOM,
2003.
Index
Adversarial Model, 5
malicious attacker, 5, 9
rational attacker, 5, 9
Attacks, 6
active, 6
black holes, 90
denial of service, 40
denial of service (DoS), 6, 30, 40,
89
denigration, 27
DoS, 38
emulation, 6, 30, 89
filtering, 6, 30, 86
flattering, 28
gratuitous detour, 90
hybrid, 89
intrusion, 6, 30, 89
node duplication, 6, 30, 89
packet dropping, 6, 29, 82
passive, 6
publicity, 27
refusal to pay, 29
replay, 6, 30, 85
report dropping, 29
repudiation, 29
selective publicity, 27
service interruption, 29
sybil, 6, 30
Authentication, 12
Bottleneck, 43
Cell, 71
Clique, 46
cardinality, 46
duration, 47
gain, 47
Compatibility Matrix, 46
Correspondent, 71
Fairness, 2, 40
fair schedule, 48
FAME, 36
Feedback, 16
Hybrid Ad-Hoc Networks, 69
Initiator, 71
iperf, 42
Magnets Testbed, 36, 56–62
Medium Access Control Protocol, 1
Message Authentication Code, 64, 73
MAC layering, 69
MicroPayment, 10
PayWord Scheme, 10
Overhead
communication overhead, 31, 91
computation overhead, 31, 92
Payment, 10, 15, 72, 78–81
Peer-to-Peer Networks (P2P), 3–4
Pseudorandom Generator, 11
Quality of Service (QoS), 1, 9
prediction, 27
110
Reputation System
reputation record, 9
update, 10
Satisfaction Level, 16
SecurID, 11
Security
objectives, 5
availability, 5
data authentication, 5
data confidentiality, 5
data integrity, 5
node anonymity, 5
node authentication, 5
non-repudiation, 5
trust, 9
Service Provision, 10, 15, 76–78
Session Closing, 10, 15–17
Session Setup, 10–14, 73–76
Spatial Reuse, 43
stream cipher, 73
tag, 11
TCA, 9
Transit Access Point (TAP), 1, 35
Trusted Central Authority, 9
Utility Function, 3
benefit, 3
cost of cooperation, 3
WiFi Networks, 1, 7
Wired Access Point (WAP), 35
Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs),
7
WirelessMesh Networks (WMNs), 1, 35
NAOUEL BEN SALEM
Research and teaching assistant
Laboratory for computer Communications and Applications (LCA) e-mail: naouel.bensalem@epfl.ch
School of Computer and Communication Sciences (IC) url: http://people.epfl.ch/naouel.bensalem
EPFL (Ecole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne), Switzerland phone: +41 21 6933697
BC 200, Station 14
CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
PERSONAL
Born in Tunis, Tunisia on August 19, 1977. Citizen of Tunisia.
RESEARCH
My research focuses on cooperation and security in wireless networks. During my PhD work at
EPFL, I have considered different wireless networks and for each of these networks I designed secure
incentive mechanisms to foster cooperation.
EDUCATION
PhD. student in communication systems, Sep. 2001 – present
EPFL, SWITZERLAND
thesis title: Secure Incentives to Cooperate for Wireless Networks
advisor: Prof. Jean-Pierre Hubaux
expected graduation: July 2007
Doctoral school in communication systems, Oct. 2000 – Jul. 2001
EPFL, SWITZERLAND
Diploma (Dipl. Ing.) in Computer Science, Sep. 1997 – Jun. 2000
ECOLE NATIONALE DES SCIENCES DE L’INFORMATIQUE (ENSI), TUNISIA
Concours National des Ingenieurs, Sep. 1995 – Jun. 1997
ECOLE PRE´PARATOIRE AUX ETUDES D’INGENIEURS DE TUNIS (IPEIT), TUNISIA
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
TEACHING
Supervised projects
Gunnar Schaefer, Assessing Fairness in Wireless Mesh Networks, course, 2007
Nicolas Forel, A Fair Scheduling for Wireless Mesh Networks, course, 2006
Gildas Avoine, Cryptanalysis of a Micro-Payment Scheme designed for Asymmetric Multi-Hop
Cellular Networks, course, 2005
Karim Mardam Bey and Amine Soufiane Zahiri, WiFi networks - Implementation and real-life
experiment, semester, 2004
Lianick Houmgny, Simulating a multi-hop cellular network using ns-2, semester, 2004
Thomas Schmid, Reputation-based WiFi deployment: ns-2 Implementation and analysis
semester, 2004
Martin Rubli, A multi-hop cellular network simulator, semester, 2004
Thomas Seiler, A simulator dedicated to multi-hop cellular networks, semester, 2003
Teaching assistant
Mobile Networks, EPFL – 2005, 2006, 2007
Self-Organized Mobile Networks, EPFL – 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007
Computer Networking I, EPFL – 2005
Object Oriented Programming - JAVA, EPFL – 2001
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
Research and teaching assistant, Sep. 2001 – present
SCHOOL OF COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATION SCIENCES (IC)
EPFL, SWITZERLAND
Reviewer for scientific journals
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Communications (TMC)
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications Multi-hop Wireless Mesh Networks (JSAC)
IEEE Wireless Communications
ACM/Kluwer Mobile Networks and Applications (MONET)
Elsevier Ad Hoc Networks Journal (ADHOC)
International Journal of Computer Systems Science and Engineering (IJCSSE)
Reviewer for scientific conferences, workshops
ACMMobicom, ACM Mobihoc, IEEE Infocom, IEEE WiOpt, ACMWiSe, ACM SenSys,
ACM SigComm, ACM VANET, IEEE TSPUC
AWARDS
EPFL doctoral school fellowship, Oct. 2000 – Jul. 2001
3rd price at ENSI, Tunisia, Jun. 2000
2nd price at ENSI, Tunisia, Jun. 1999
1st price at ENSI, Tunisia, Jun. 1998
GENERAL IT SKILLS
Programming: C, C++, HTML, Ns-2, Java, Pascal, Ada,
Operating systems: Windows, Linux, Unix, DOS
Mathematical tools: MatLab
Presentation: LaTeX, Microsoft Word, Powerpoint, Excel
REFERENCES
Prof. Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Full Professor,
EPFL, Switzerland
Room BC 207, +41 21 6932627, jean-pierre.hubaux@epfl.ch
Prof. Markus Jakobsson, Associate Professor,
INDIANA UNIVERSITY, BLOOMINGTON, USA
Eigenmann 1026, (812) 856 1807, markus@indiana.edu
PUBLICATIONS
Journals
1. N. Ben Salem and J.-P. Hubaux, Securing Wireless Mesh Networks, IEEE Wireless Communica-
tions, vol. 13, nr. 2, 2006.
2. N. Ben Salem, L. Buttya´n, J.-P. Hubaux, and M. Jakobsson, Node Cooperation in Hybrid Ad hoc
Networks, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing (TMC), vol. 5, nr. 4, 2006.
3. N. Ben Salem, J.-P. Hubaux, andM. Jakobsson,Reputation-basedWi-Fi Deployment, ACMMobile
Computing and Communications Review (MC2R), vol. 9, nr. 3, 2005.
Conferences, workshops
4. N. Ben Salem and J.-P. Hubaux, A Fair Scheduling for Wireless Mesh Networks, in Proceedings of
the IEEE Workshop on Wireless Mesh Networks (WiMesh), Santa Clara, CA, USA, September 2005.
5. N. Ben Salem, J.-P. Hubaux, and M. Jakobsson, Reputation-based Wi-Fi Deployment: Protocols
and Security Analysis, in Proceedings of the ACM International Workshop on Wireless Mobile Ap-
plications and Services on WLAN Hotspots (WMASH), Philadelphia, USA, October 2004.
6. N. Ben Salem, J.-P. Hubaux, and M. Jakobsson, Fuelling WiFi deployment: A reputation-based
solution, in Proceedings of the International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile,
Ad-Hoc, and Wireless Networks (WiOpt), Cambridge, UK, March 2004.
7. N. Ben Salem, L. Buttya´n, J.-P. Hubaux, and M. Jakobsson, A Charging and Rewarding Scheme
for Packet Forwarding in Multi-hop Cellular Networks, in Proceedings of MobiHoc, Annapolis,
USA. June, 2003.
8. L. Buttya´n and N. Ben Salem, A Payment Scheme for Broadcast Multimedia Streams, in Proceed-
ings of ISCC, Hammamet, Tunisia, 3-5 July 2001.
Technical reports, posters
9. N. Ben Salem, J.-P. Hubaux, and M. Jakobsson, Reputation-based Wi-Fi Deployment: Protocols
and Security Analysis, EPFL Technical Report LCA-REPORT-2004-014, 2004.
10. N. Ben Salem, L. Buttya´n, J.-P. Hubaux, and M. Jakobsson, Cooperation in Multi-hop Cellular
Networks, EPFL Technical Report LCA-REPORT-2003-015, 2003.
11. N. Ben Salem, L. Buttya´n, J.-P. Hubaux, and M. Jakobsson, Incentive mechanisms in multi-hop
wireless networks, Poster at the International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile,
Ad-Hoc, and Wireless Networks (WiOpt), INRIA Sophia-Antipolis, France. March 3-5, 2003.
Under submission
12. N. Ben Salem, R. Karrer, A. Feldmann and J.-P. Hubaux, Fairness in Wireless Mesh Networks,
submitted to IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications (TWC).
———————————–
Lausanne, Mar. 27, 2007
